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2 CONTINUED EVIDENTIARY HEARING re Rule 60(b) and Related Motions
3 (Case No. 08-13555-jmp and Adv. Proc. No. 08-01420-jmp)

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1 P R O C E E D I N G S

2 THE CLERK: All rise.

3 THE COURT: Be seated, please. Good morning.

4 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Good morning, Your Honor.

5 MR. TAMBE: Good morning, Your Honor. Jayant Tambe
6 from Jones Day, for Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. The movants
7 will call John Olvany as their next witness.

8 THE COURT: Okay.

9 Mr. Olvany? Good morning. Please raise your right
10 hand.

11 (Witness sworn)

12 THE COURT: Be seated, please.

13 MR. TAMBE: Your Honor, may I approach with some
14 binders?

15 THE COURT: Yes.

16 (Pause)

17 VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION

18 BY MR. TAMBE:

19 Q. Good morning, Mr. Olvany.

20 A. Good morning.

21 Q. Could you please describe for the Court your educational
22 background?

23 A. Certainly. I graduated from Williams College with a
24 degree in political science in 1982.

25 Q. And could you briefly describe your career in the

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1 financial industry after graduation?

2 A. Sure. Ov -- after graduation from Williams, I spent over
3 twenty-odd years in the financial services business in a
4 variety of roles in trading, sales and sales management,
5 particularly in the fixed-income markets. And for the last
6 sixteen years of my career, my specialization was in the
7 corporate-bond market and derivatives of the corporate-bond
8 market.

9 Q. If you could turn, in the binder I handed you, to tab 1A,
10 please.

11 MR. TAMBE: And that's Movants' Trial Exhibit 152A.

12 Q. And could you describe for the Court what that document
13 is?

14 A. This is a copy of my CV.

15 Q. And does this set out your professional experience and
16 your education?

17 A. Yes, it does.

18 Q. And does it also identify the registrations you have held?

19 A. Yes, it does.

20 MR. TAMBE: Your Honor, we move Movants' Trial Exhibit
21 152A into evidence.

22 MR. THOMAS: No objection.

23 THE COURT: It's admitted.

24 (CV of John Olvany was hereby received into evidence as
25 Movants' Trial Exhibit 152A, as of this date.)

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1 Q. I guess, starting chronologically from back in time with
2 your first job in the financial industry, if you could walk
3 through your positions and describe what you did insofar as
4 your experience relates to the opinions that you're offering in
5 this matter here?

6 A. Certainly. My initial job in the sales and trading aspect
7 of the financial markets was with S.G. Warburg, which became
8 part of UBS. And for S.G. Warburg, I was the representative in
9 the Tokyo office. I was responsible for making markets, which
10 is providing bids and offers to clients in the Asian time hours
11 for U.S. Treasury securities.

12 Q. Where did you work next?

13 A. And then after I left S.G. Warburg, I joined Continental
14 Illinois in Chicago, which eventually became Bank of America.
15 My role there was more specialized. I was responsible
16 exclusively for making markets, i.e., providing bids and offers
17 to clients for intermediate treasury and agency securities,
18 that meaning securities between five years and ten years.

19 Q. Where did you work next?

20 A. Upon leaving Continental, I joined Morgan Stanley in 1991.
21 And when I first joined Morgan Stanley in 1991, I was a
22 salesperson in the Chicago office. And in the context of being
23 a salesperson, at that time your responsibilities were rather
24 broad within the fixed-income world. So during that time
25 period, I executed trades, which would be buying and selling

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1 securities across the gamut, really, of fixed-income
2 instruments, everything at the time that was actively traded,
3 which would have been corporate bonds, mortgage-backed
4 securities, asset-backed securities, CMOs, commercial
5 mortgages, et cetera.

6 Q. Okay, and in the course of that -- you've described CMOs
7 and the various types of asset-backed securities. Did that
8 expose you to the world of structured finance and structured
9 securitized products?

10 A. Yes, it did. In the early '90s, there was a fair amount
11 of development in a variety of different types of structured
12 products. We at Morgan Stanley started to underwrite and sell
13 project-finance securities, which also incorporated, you know,
14 some of the structured-finance techniques. And in the context
15 of my responsibilities at Morgan Stanley, I was also
16 responsible for valuing bonds on a regular basis, for clients
17 on a periodic basis, and those securities were -- I would value
18 bonds both in the daily course of my activities every day, in
19 addition to providing periodic marks on securities in
20 conjunction with my trading groups in New York.

21 Q. Where did you work next after this stint at Morgan Stanley
22 from '91 through '96?

23 A. I joined Credit Suisse First Boston in Chicago in a
24 similar capacity. The difference primarily was that my client
25 base was a larger group of clients with a larger group of

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1 assets under management. And once again, my responsibilities
2 were more or less across the whole spectrum of fixed-income
3 securities. But during my time period at Credit Suisse First
4 Boston, that's when I began to specialize specifically in the
5 corporate-bond markets, but I also did have some experience and
6 responsibilities for asset-backed and collateralized mortgage
7 bonds as well. And once again, in that capacity, on a daily
8 basis I would be discussing value of securities with clients
9 and with traders in New York in trying to come to agreement in
10 order to do transactions. And then also I, once again,
11 provided periodic valuations in conjunction with my trading
12 desk for clients as well.

13 Q. And when you refer to clients both at your work at Morgan
14 Stanley and then at Credit Suisse, could you describe generally
15 sort of the client base that you were serving?

16 A. Certainly. Broadly speaking, it would be referred to as
17 an institutional client base. My clients across my career were
18 hedge funds, insurance companies, banks, trust departments of
19 banks, asset managers, some foreign ent -- some sovereign
20 entities as well, foreign central banks. So, generally
21 speaking, we're talking about a very sophisticated client base
22 that had a substantial asset -- substantial amount of assets
23 under management.

24 Q. Now, after your work at Credit Suisse, you returned to
25 Morgan Stanley, correct?

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1 A. That's correct.

2 Q. And you worked at Morgan Stanley then from 2000 through
3 2008?

4 A. Right. I rejoined Morgan Stanley in 2000, and my initial
5 responsibilities at Morgan Stanley was to be the senior member
6 of the corporate sales group in Chicago. And then I eventually
7 was named the head of the office -- the head of the
8 institutional fixed-income office in Chicago, and promoted to
9 managing director in 2003. I became the head of the office in
10 2002. During that time period, I continued to have
11 responsibility for covering, as we call it, clients and, you
12 know, throughout my entire, you know, career at Morgan Stanley.
13 And then I also took on the responsibilities of being sales
14 manager, which included overseeing the entire process, for our
15 office, of providing valuations to clients on a regular basis.
16 So I had to sign off on everything that went out as far as a
17 price for any of our clients.

18 Q. Now, after you stopped working at Morgan Stanley, where
19 have you been working since you left Morgan Stanley?

20 A. I left Morgan Stanley in July of 2008, and I started
21 working with Navigant in September of 2008. My first
22 assignment -- or the first matter I was involved in -- I began
23 in September 2008 and I'd been working with Navigant and
24 subsequently the Chicago Partners, or Navigant Economics Group,
25 since that period of time.

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1 Q. And on pages 2 and 3 of your CV, Movants' Trial Exhibit
2 152A, does that identify some of the testimonial and consulting
3 experience you had while with Navigant and Chicago Partners?

4 A. Yes, it does. It lays out a number of the matters that
5 I've been involved in.

6 Q. Now, over the course of your career in the financial
7 industry, did you become familiar with different types of
8 corporate financing and corporate debt?

9 A. Yes, absolutely. During, obviously, over a period of
10 twenty-plus years in the markets, there was a lot of innovation
11 that took place, and I was exposed to a variety of different
12 securities. And I began working in the markets, you know, when
13 it was a rather -- you know, rather simple business. Over the
14 course of time, I was exposed to a variety of number of
15 securities.

16 My experience specifically with the corporation auction-
17 rate securities, really similar to the securities that I valued
18 in this matter, became -- really kind of came to fruition in
19 the early part of 2008. That was a time period where there
20 were some dislocations in the auction-rate securities market,
21 and Morgan Stanley and others were looking to try to develop a
22 different client base, a different type of -- different client
23 base in order to make some of these securities more actively
24 traded in the markets. And some of my clients were very
25 interested in taking advantage of buying highly-rated assets at

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1 attractive coupon rates that were potentially available at that
2 period of time.

3 Q. You brought up the issue of auction-rate securities.

4 Could you describe how auction-rate securities fit into the
5 broader world of corporate financing or corporate debt?

6 A. Certainly. I mean, it's just one of many different ways
7 that a company can finance itself. Companies can finance
8 themselves with, you know, fixed-rate fixed-term debt. They
9 can finance themselves with a variable term debt. It's just
10 one of a continuum of different types of securities that
11 corporations can issue in order to finance their operations.
12 It's -- and it -- the unique characteristic is the auction-
13 setting process, but other than that, it is still, once again,
14 a corporate security; that is, the inherent issue that one
15 needs to look at is the underlying creditworthiness of the
16 corporation that's involved in offering the securities.

17 Q. Now, when you are doing a valuation, whether it be of
18 auction-rate securities or of other types of corporate bonds,
19 again, generally over the course of your career, what types of
20 techniques or approaches have you used, again, as it relates to
21 the work you did in this matter?

22 A. Certainly. I think the first -- you know, throughout the
23 twenty-odd years that I spent in the markets, the first place
24 that anyone would look for valuations was observable
25 transactions that would take place in either the exact security

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1 or CUSIP that you were being asked to value or similar
2 securities that you were being asked to value. In absence of
3 that, then one would go about looking to value the securities
4 using different types of models that more or less utilized
5 discounted cash flow analysis. And those models changed
6 over -- you know, over the course of my career, and some of
7 those models are -- would be mentioned rather frequently:
8 Bloomberg, Pi-Path (ph.), Fincat (ph.) and others.

9 Q. Have you used those in the course of your career, sir?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Have you used them with respect to this assignment?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. For complex securities and structured securities, which we
14 discussed, would your review include review of the transaction
15 documents, the indenture or the offering circular, documents
16 like that?

17 A. Yes. I'd say that for the more complex securities that
18 one would look to value, you would definitely need to take a
19 very long hard look at whatever was publicly available
20 information, whether it be offering documents, rating-agency
21 reports, trustee reports if the security was of that nature, or
22 any material that would be available in the public domain,
23 whether it be research from your own firm or other firms as
24 well.

25 Q. And you used all of these various techniques to value the

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1 securities that you valued in this case, sir?

2 A. Yes, I did. I used both observable prices that were
3 available to me, as well as discounted cash flow analysis, in
4 order to reach the valuations that I reached in this matter.

5 Q. And did you also consult offering documents and other
6 types of transaction documents to arrive at your opinions?

7 A. Yeah, absolutely. That's the first place that one needs
8 to look for almost any of the securities in the corporate-bond
9 market, because there's such -- there are so many unique
10 different securities within the corporate-bond market that you
11 really need to understand exactly what the CUSIP is before you
12 can really go about valuing the security, because there's so
13 much intricacy and nuance to one security versus another.

14 MR. TAMBE: Your Honor, we tender Mr. Olvany as an
15 expert in the valuation of corporate securities.

16 MR. THOMAS: No objection.

17 THE COURT: He's accepted as an expert in that area.

18 MR. TAMBE: Thank you, Your Honor.

19 DIRECT EXAMINATION

20 BY MR. TAMBE:

21 Q. Mr. Olvany, if you could turn in your binder to tab 1.

22 MR. TAMBE: That's Movants' Trial Exhibit 152.

23 Q. And could you describe for the Court what that document
24 is?

25 A. This is the expert report that I filed in this matter.

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1 Q. And have you reviewed this expert report before testifying
2 here today?

3 A. Yes, I have.

4 Q. And is it accurate in all material respects, sir?

5 A. Yes, it is.

6 Q. And would you adopt as your testimony on the stand your
7 analysis and conclusions that you set out in this expert
8 report?

9 A. Yes, I would.

10 MR. TAMBE: Your Honor, we tender Movants' Trial
11 Exhibit 152 in evidence.

12 MR. THOMAS: No objection.

13 THE COURT: It's admitted.

14 (Expert report prepared by John Olvany was hereby received into
15 evidence as Movants' Trial Exhibit 152, as of this date.)

16 Q. If you could turn, Mr. Olvany, to tab 2 of your binder,
17 which is Movants' Trial Exhibit 823. And could you describe
18 for the Court what that document is?

19 A. Yes. This is a doc -- this is a declaration that I
20 submitted in this matter -- yeah, in --

21 Q. For what purpose?

22 A. -- July.

23 Q. For what purpose?

24 A. In order to respond to some comments by counsel -- I'm
25 sorry, by Barclays with regard to my initial report.

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1 Q. Did this declaration change any of the opinions in your
2 expert report, sir?

3 A. No, it did not.

4 Q. And have you reviewed this declaration before testifying
5 here today?

6 A. Yes, I did.

7 Q. And would you adopt as your testimony the statements set
8 out in your declaration, Movants' Trial Exhibit 823?

9 A. Yes, I would.

10 MR. TAMBE: Your Honor, we offer Movants' Trial
11 Exhibit 823 in evidence.

12 MR. THOMAS: No objection.

13 THE COURT: It's admitted.

14 (Declaration of John Olvany was hereby received into evidence
15 as Movants' Trial Exhibit 823, as of this date.)

16 Q. Now, moving into the heart of your analysis, Mr. Olvany,
17 if you could briefly describe the section of securities, the
18 number of securities, that you valued as part of your analysis?

19 A. Certainly. I prepared some slides today for
20 demonstratives today. But --

21 MR. TAMBE: Your Honor, may I approach and hand these
22 out?

23 THE COURT: Yes.

24 (Pause)

25 A. If --

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1 Q. And if you can just start on slide 3 and orient the Court
2 in terms of what slide 3 is, and then we can go into your
3 analysis.

4 A. Certainly. Slide 3 is a table that you see has come from
5 Dr. Zmijewski's report and, in it, it lays out the number of
6 securities that I valued in this matter, which was twenty-two
7 distinct CUSIPs, and it indicates the -- that the
8 undervaluation that I considered in this matter was about 380
9 million dollars.

10 Q. And did you do some analysis to split out the 381, how
11 that's distributed across those 22 securities?

12 A. Yes. There's another slide -- on slide 5 of the deck,
13 there -- this is a table that comes from my report. There's
14 three different groups of securities that I looked at from my
15 perspective: the Giants Stadium LLC; project revenue bonds,
16 where I saw a valuation differential of roughly 350 million
17 dollars; there was a group of corporate securities, corporate
18 bonds, excluding Giants Stadium bonds, which I calculated to be
19 an undervaluation of approximately 29 million dollars; and then
20 a distinct universe within the corporate-bond market, which I
21 refer to as covered bonds, and that specific type of security I
22 viewed as being undervalued by approximately 3 million dollars.

23 Q. Now, before we go into the analysis of these different
24 categories or subcategories of bonds that you valued, let's
25 take a step back. How did you select these particular twenty-

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1 two? How did it come about that you were valuing these twenty-
2 two and not some other population of bonds?

3 A. As you can see from the previous slide, there -- a group
4 of Navigant experts sorted the purchase portfolio and looked
5 for securities where there was a differential in value between
6 Barclays' value and Bank of New York's value of a million
7 dollars, whether it would be a positive or a negative
8 differential. Within that universe of securities, then I was
9 responsible for valuing what I considered to be a corporate
10 bond within that universe, and by "a corporate bond" what I
11 mean specifically is that bonds that are the source of cash
12 flow for those bonds are coming from a specific corporation or
13 supranational entity. And within that sort, I specifically
14 valued eighteen bonds that fell into that category.

15 There -- you know, as you can see on the slide, there was
16 another twenty-seven of the bonds that would have come out of
17 that sort that I did not value because the criteria that I was
18 looking to use was not -- or the market inputs that I was
19 looking to use to do my type of valuation was not available to
20 me. So those securities were valued by Mr. Slattery, using
21 third-party prices.

22 And then, lastly, there are four securities issued by the
23 Giants Stadium LLC that I valued. Those securities, as we'll
24 see later, were valued at the same price -- or same valuation
25 by both Barclays and Bank of New York. I elected to discuss

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1 them in my report and value those securities because Professor
2 Pfleiderer discussed them in his expert report.

3 Q. Now, for the twenty-seven that you said were valued by Mr.
4 Slattery, do you know whether requests were made of Barclays to
5 get the underlying detailed information about these securities,
6 such as trustee reports, offering documents, other kinds of
7 information?

8 A. My understanding is that when Navigant's experts came up
9 with a group of CUSIPs that met the sort of criteria that all
10 of the offering documents, trustee reports, rating-agency
11 reports and the like were requested of Barclays, we did not
12 receive an adequate amount of information for me to go about
13 the analysis that I would have had to do in order to value
14 those securities in a manner that I wanted to value those
15 securities.

16 Q. Let's go into the Giants Stadium bond valuation. And
17 before we go down that path, if you could provide an overview
18 of what these bonds are, the bonds that you were valuing, the
19 four Giants Stadium bonds?

20 A. Certainly. It would probably be helpful to move to slide
21 6. As I mentioned before, there are four what I refer to as
22 Giants Stadium bonds in the portfolio that I was asked to look
23 at. These bonds were issued by a special-purpose entity,
24 Giants Stadium LLC, to finance the new stadium in New Jersey at
25 the Meadowlands. These were corporate auction-rate securities

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1 and they were part of an overall seven-tranche transaction that
2 was underwritten by Lehman Brothers and Goldman Sachs for a
3 total financing of 650 million dollars. These corporate
4 auction-rate securities had a maximum coupon rate that would
5 come into effect, in the event of a fail of the auction, of
6 twenty-two percent.

7 And I mention the auction right now, the rate, and I
8 mentioned that previously as well. One of the characteristics
9 of these particular auction-rate securities is that the rate
10 for the securities was determined, you know, at each auction,
11 which is every twenty-eight days. And those auctions,
12 initially when the bonds were issued, were conducted by Goldman
13 Sachs and Lehman Brothers, who were the underwriters of the
14 overall transaction. Lehman Brothers was an underwriter and
15 the broker-dealer conducting the auction on four tranches, or
16 four bonds, of the deal. And Goldman Sachs, at the time of the
17 offering and at the time of the filing of bankruptcy, they were
18 the auction agent for three securities.

19 Q. Now, in terms of the valuation of these bonds, if you
20 could give an overview of what conclusions you reached in terms
21 of the value of these bonds, and then we can back into the
22 bases for your opinions?

23 A. Certainly. The total face value of these four securities
24 was about a little over 400 million dollars. The screen shows
25 408 million dollars. I valued these securities at 100 percent

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1 of face value; hence, 408 million dollars as well. Barclays
2 valued these -- three of these bonds at the time of the sale
3 transaction -- or for balance-sheet purposes, at 10 percent
4 of -- approximately ten percent of face value, and a fourth one
5 at approximately 44 percent of face value. There -- and,
6 hence, the difference in valuation that I mentioned previously,
7 which was roughly 350 million dollars.

8 Q. And the slide 8 basically set out CUSIP by CUSIP the
9 valuation differences? The three bonds that are valued at ten
10 percent by Barclays are the first three lines, and then the
11 fourth line is the bond that was valued at about forty-four
12 percent, is that right?

13 A. Yes, that's correct. These are the actual CUSIP numbers
14 of each one of the individual securities.

15 Q. Now, in terms of your approach to valuing these
16 securities, what factors did you consider; how did you arrive
17 at your valuation of par for these bonds?

18 A. Well, let's -- what I -- first thing I did was to get the
19 offering documentation on these securities, looked for the
20 publicly available information on the securities, which
21 included the rating-agency reports, and also take a look at --
22 in the context of looking at the offering documents, there was
23 a swap that was put in place between Lehman Brothers and the
24 Giants Stadium LLC, which -- the details of which are on -- or
25 some of the highlights of which are on slide 9. And that was a

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1 fixed-for-floating swap that the Giants entered into where
2 the -- where Lehman would pay the floating rate, that was set
3 by the auction, to the Giants, and then the Giants would pay
4 that out to the investors, or the holders of the securities,
5 and the Giants would pay to Lehman Brothers a fixed rate of
6 6.1855 percent. Clearly this swap fixed the Giants' interest
7 payments for the life of the transaction and provided them
8 interest-rate protection.

9 On -- one of the key features of this is that the Giants
10 terminated the swap on September 18th and, as a holder of the
11 securities, Barclays did not assume the -- Lehman's former
12 position in the swap. And -- but they -- but the Giants were
13 still required to pay the coupon rates set by the security over
14 time.

15 Q. If I can just talk about sort of the pre- and post-
16 bankruptcy aspects of what you've just described. Pre-
17 bankruptcy you have the bonds, the auction-rate bonds; they
18 have an interest rate that is set by an auction process, is
19 that right?

20 A. That's correct, yes.

21 Q. And that could be a fluctuating floating rate?

22 A. Yeah, I would -- I wouldn't use the word "floating rate",
23 but a good change from -- it would change from period to period
24 potentially. So the auction process that takes place every
25 twenty-eight days sets the coupon rate of the security. The

Page 23

1 security does not have a contractually binding rate that was
2 set, except in the event of a fail or some of the other
3 characteristics of it.

4 Q. Okay, so pre-bankruptcy you have this auction process that
5 determines what the interest rate's going to be. There's also
6 a swap between the Giants Stadium LLC and Lehman Brothers,
7 correct?

8 A. That's correct, yes.

9 Q. And basically the combination of the auction bonds and the
10 swap means, at the end of the day, pre-bankruptcy, the Giants
11 are paying a fixed rate of interest on these bonds, is that
12 right?

13 A. That's correct. I mean, by virtue of this swap that was
14 in place, the Giants had entered into a fixed financing for the
15 full term of the securities at 6.1855 percent for the life of
16 the swap and the life of the bonds.

17 Q. And, now, post-bankruptcy, post the filing of Lehman
18 Brothers Holdings Inc., the Giants terminated the swap
19 agreement, is that right?

20 A. Yes, the Giants terminated the swap agreement. There was
21 a -- on September 18th, in -- at that point in time the Giants
22 no longer were -- you know, had the benefit of the swap,
23 because they terminated it, and hence the Giants were exposed
24 to whatever the interest rate that was set at the auction at
25 that point in time.

Page 24

1 Q. And the swap -- are you aware of any similar swap being
2 entered into by Barclays and the Giants after Barclays
3 purchased these auction-rate securities?

4 A. No, I'm not.

5 Q. And was the analysis of the swap and the fact that the
6 swap was terminated, was that -- did that feature in your
7 opinions and your view that these bonds should be valued at par
8 as of 12:01 a.m. on the 22nd of September?

9 A. Yes, I (sic) did, because in my opinion the absence of
10 that swap exposed the Giants to rates of -- higher rates of
11 interest than they had previously been exposed to. So at that
12 point in time, it was a much different type of financing from
13 the Giant's perspective. And the Giants could potentially
14 redeem the securities, which was available to them as the
15 issuer of the securities at each -- at the end of each auction
16 period, and refinance those securities at whatever, you know,
17 their current alternative financing rates would be, which was a
18 significant feature in looking at these securities, from my
19 perspective.

20 Q. Now, you described earlier, again, pre-bankruptcy, that
21 there are these seven tranches of bonds; you got four of these
22 where Lehman is serving as the broker-dealer or the auction
23 agent, and there's another three where Goldman Sachs is serving
24 as the auction agent, is that right?

25 A. That's correct, yes.

Page 25

1 Q. And they're all part of the same 650 million dollar
2 offering?

3 A. Yes. There was a -- yeah, there was a 650 million dollar
4 offering, and Goldman was the broker-dealer conducting the
5 auction for a group of the securities, and Lehman was the
6 broker-dealer. And my understanding from reading the offering
7 documents is that similar -- there was a similar swap in place
8 with Goldman Sachs as well.

9 Q. Now, focusing on the role of the broker-dealer or the
10 auction agent, once Lehman had declared bankruptcy, was it able
11 to continue serving as an auction agent or a broker-dealer for
12 the transaction for the four bonds?

13 A. No, they were not.

14 Q. How did you take into account, in your analysis, the
15 impact that would have that there was no longer a functioning
16 or a viable auction agent for these bonds?

17 A. Well, I read the documentation rather clearly, and the
18 documentation made it quite clear that the Giants could appoint
19 a new auction agent, you know, upon the absence of Lehman as
20 the prior auct -- I'm sorry, the prior broker-dealer. And
21 because Goldman Sachs was already involved in the transaction,
22 I thought that that was a very likely scenario, highly likely
23 scenario, that, you know, Goldman or some other broker-dealer
24 that had presence in the auction-rate market would take on that
25 position. And there also was a rate-setting mechanism in place

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1 for -- to set the rate in the absence of an auction as well.

2 Q. Okay, so if an auction didn't happen and there was no
3 auction agent, what did the documents provide in terms of what
4 rate would apply going forward?

5 A. Until the appointment of a new auction agent, the rate
6 that was set would have been 100 percent -- 110 percent, I
7 believe, of one month LIBOR, which was the rate that was set
8 prior -- between the September 22nd and the first auction after
9 the appointment of Goldman Sachs on November 14th.

10 Q. And if that persisted and if no auction agent ever got
11 appointed, what would happen?

12 A. I observed in the offering documents that there was a
13 mechanism put in place where, if over a period of time there
14 wasn't a new auction agent put in place, that this maximum
15 coupon rate of twenty-two percent would become a viable coupon
16 rate going forward.

17 Q. If you could turn, in your binder, to tab 7, which is
18 Movants' Trial Exhibit 930.

19 A. (Witness complies).

20 Q. And could you describe for the Court what appears behind
21 tab 7, what is Movants' Trial Exhibit 930?

22 A. This is the offering circular that was the key document
23 that I looked at in the course of valuing the Giants Stadium
24 LLC bonds. And, you know, I would add also that an offering
25 circular or offering memorandum or prospectus would be, you

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1 know, a document that, for any type of complex security, that
2 anybody that is looking to value those securities with any
3 great level of detail would consider this the first document
4 that they really should spend some time looking at.

5 Q. And does it identify at the bottom of the page the
6 underwriters for the offering?

7 A. Yes, it does. It identifies Goldman on the left side and
8 Lehman Brothers on the right side.

9 Q. Now, you can confirm for me, but the document that is
10 marked as Movants' Trial Exhibit 930, that's just an excerpt of
11 the offering circular and its various appendices, is that
12 right?

13 A. Yeah, I believe this is the cover page and some other
14 excerpts of it. It's a rather lengthy document.

15 Q. Any idea how large a document that is?

16 A. It was pretty large.

17 Q. If you could turn to the appendix that is excerpted there
18 behind the cover page, Appendix A. Could you describe for the
19 Court the relevance of that appendix?

20 A. This appendix is referred to as Auction Procedures, and
21 this provides a lot of the defined terms, you know, for the
22 specific transaction. And it, you know, defines a lot of the
23 very important aspects of this particular deal that one needs
24 to look at.

25 Q. Okay. If we could turn to page K-13, which is Section

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1 2.04. Again, could you describe for the Court what that
2 section is generally? And we can talk about some specific
3 aspects of it.

4 A. Yeah, on K-13, under section 2.04, Determination of an
5 Auction Rate, this lays out the method by which the rate is
6 determined, and it also lays out some of the information that
7 would be relevant in the event that there wasn't an auction
8 agent in place.

9 Q. And in particular, if you could turn to page K-14.

10 A. Yes, K-14 -- essentially the end of K-13 through to the
11 middle of K-14, almost to the end of section 2.04, you know, in
12 my reading of this document, it lays out the procedures that
13 would be in place if there was no auction agent.

14 MR. TAMBE: Your Honor, we move Movants' Trial Exhibit
15 930 in evidence.

16 MR. THOMAS: Your Honor, we note that it's not a
17 complete document, but with that note we have no objection.

18 THE COURT: It's admitted, and I note that it's not a
19 complete document too.

20 (Excerpt of offering circular used in Mr. Olvany's valuation of
21 the Giants Stadium LLC bonds was hereby received as Movants'
22 Exhibit 930, as of this date.)

23 MR. TAMBE: Thank you, Your Honor.

24 Q. How did Barclays value the Giants Stadium bonds?

25 A. Barclays adopted -- you know, they didn't value these

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1 securities in their normal course of business, because there is
2 deposition testimony out there that demonstrates that Barclays
3 at the time was not a participant in the auction-rate
4 securities market. They didn't have a desk, according to some
5 of the deposition testimony that I read, and so they did not
6 value these securities in the context of their normal course of
7 business.

8 They -- what Barclays did was they didn't -- they adopted
9 the Bank of New York pricing for these securities and,
10 according to the deposition testimony that I read of Mr.
11 Teague, they did what he described as a cursory analysis of
12 these securities before adopting the Bank of New York pricing.

13 MR. TAMBE: If we could just pull up Mr. Teague's
14 testimony, pages Bates 65? And if you could focus on line 15
15 to the bottom?

16 Q. And the question was asked of Mr. Teague:

17 "Q. That's what I'm trying to figure out. Was your analysis
18 detailed or cursory when you ascribed a value to the Giants
19 Stadium bonds for purposes of the acquisition balance sheet?"

20 Q. There's an objection. Looks like the transcript may be a
21 little garbled there.

22 "Q. Your word 'cursory' -- what do you mean by 'cursory'?

23 "A. The overall view of the book was that if we didn't have a
24 price, then we would ascribe the price provided by Bank of New
25 York."

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1 MR. TAMBE: And can you go on to page 66, please? And
2 highlight -- I guess it's the -- from 2 down to 23.

3 "A. I have not performed a large amount of auction-rate note
4 analysis in the past because we as a firm did not have an
5 auction-rate desk like Lehman had. We were not bringing
6 positions to market. At that point in time, there was the
7 issue of breaking the dollar, as they stated, where some firms
8 were having issues, specifically money market funds, because
9 their assets had been worth less than a dollar, so there was no
10 auction-rate market. Looking at it from that perspective, and
11 here's an asset that hadn't traded for six months, we put
12 our -- you know, our understanding was, well, if BoNY was able
13 to ascribe a price to this, they, you know, must have
14 additional detailed information; so let's work with the BoNY
15 price, because we have no other market data out there. There's
16 no -- again, for an asset that hasn't traded in six months,
17 you're not going to have additional market data to ascribe to
18 it directly from the marketplace."

19 Q. And is that some of the testimony that you were referring
20 to in your earlier answer, sir?

21 A. Yes, it was, and I believe that this testimony -- that I
22 cited it in my declaration as well.

23 MR. TAMBE: If you'd actually continue and finish the
24 line of questioning. There's a question that begins at the end
25 of page 66, over onto page 67.

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1 "Q. Just so I understand your answer, you guessed that BoNY
2 may have had some additional --"

3 MR. TAMBE: And if you could highlight the top down to
4 20.

5 "Q. -- information about the securities, and that's why you
6 felt comfortable taking the BoNY price, is that right?"

7 Q. There's an objection.

8 "A. I can't speak to how BoNY performed any of their
9 valuations.

10 "Q. You have no idea, right? You have no idea whether they
11 had any special insights into the security versus any of the
12 others?

13 "A. No, I would not have known how specific -- any of the
14 specifics of any of the BoNY valuation.

15 "Q. And in general, you thought that their valuations were
16 riddled with stale information, improper third-party marks, all
17 sorts of problems?

18 "A. Which is why we used them as the last -- this was our last
19 resort in the hierarchy."

20 Q. And did you consider that testimony in arriving at your --
21 in your declaration when you addressed some of the challenges
22 that have been made by Barclays to your opinion?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Now, this testimony and the value ascribed by Barclays --
25 was the value ascribed by Barclays sometime in February 2009

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1 for acquisition balance-sheet purposes? Correct?

2 A. Yes, that's my understanding.

3 Q. However -- and acquisition balance-sheet purposes --

4 Barclays was valuing this as of September 22nd, 2008?

5 MR. THOMAS: Objection, Your Honor. Leading.

6 THE COURT: Okay, I'll sustain it, although I would
7 note that all the examinations, particularly of the experts,
8 have included a lot of leading questions. But it's sustained.

9 Q. As of what date, Mr. Olvany, was Barclays valuing the
10 Giants Stadium bonds for acquisition balance-sheet purposes?

11 A. At 12:01 on September 22nd is the as-of date.

12 Q. Now, between the 22nd of September and February 2009, are
13 you aware of what Barclays had done with respect to their
14 valuation of the Giants Stadium bonds?

15 A. Yes, I'm aware of that. There's a couple of different
16 slides in my presentation. But first of all, by December 31st
17 of 2008, Barclays had marked up the securities to a hundred
18 percent of face value, which was the same face -- which was the
19 same valuation that I arrived in my analysis. And in addition
20 to that, Barclays had marked up the securities on October 31st
21 to seventy-five percent of face value for three of them, and
22 about eighty percent of face value for the fourth value. And I
23 think that's extremely relevant, that date especially, because
24 that was also prior to Goldman Sachs being named as the auction
25 agent in the security, which is one of the criticisms that's

1 been mention with regard to my analysis.

2 Q. So on two occasions between September and December,
3 Barclays marked up the value of the Giant Stadium bonds, is
4 that what you're saying, sir?

5 A. Yes. It's -- yes, that's correct.

6 Q. And if we could turn to slides 12 and 13. Is that where
7 you set out the analysis? In particular, on 13, what does that
8 demonstrative show, sir?

9 A. This demonstrates that the value of the securities was
10 marked up -- or the value of the four securities was marked up
11 from the original pricing as of September 22nd, by both Bank of
12 New York and Barclays, of approximately 59 million dollars up
13 to the full face value of 408. So as you could see at the
14 bottom, you know, there was a substantial gain of about 250
15 million dollars for -- within thirty-nine days of the valuation
16 date, which, as I mentioned prior, was not -- was before the --
17 before Goldman Sachs was appointed the auction agent in the
18 securities.

19 So it should be noted that the auctions between October
20 31st and the Sept -- the November 14th date were not conducted
21 and, as a result, the interest rate was set at 110 percent of
22 LIBOR.

23 Q. Now, you've seen some documentation in this case about
24 various rationales given by Barclays for marking up the value
25 of the Giants Stadium bonds post-acquisition date but before

1 year end, correct?

2 A. Yes, I have.

3 Q. And have you studied those rationales or reasons given by
4 Barclays?

5 A. Yes, I have, and I've highlighted those -- or I cited
6 those in my reports. There were a few examp -- or statements
7 made. I'd say that slide 14 probably is a pretty good synopsis
8 of what some of those reasons are. First of all, I'd like to
9 point out that in my opinion every one of these points that has
10 been mentioned by Barclays on the memo, which I believe is a
11 November 21st, 2008 document, all of these points that are
12 mentioned by Mr. Teague are -- were known and knowable at that
13 point in time.

14 So first of all, the rate-setting mechanism. They cite a
15 newfound understanding of the rate-setting mechanism resulting
16 from a failed auction. And I think that, you know, any market
17 participant that had spent the time to look at the offering
18 document that I did would understand what the rate-setting
19 mechanism was for the security.

20 Q. And your understanding, sir, is that between the time of
21 acquisition and the time that the financial statements were
22 released in February 2009 that Barclays had five months to
23 study all of these securities?

24 A. Yes. Yeah, absolutely. They had, you know, ample time to
25 get the offering document, which would have been available to

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1 them as a holder of the security, and, you know, understand the
2 offering document.

3 Q. If you can continue down the list?

4 A. There is a second point that's mentioned, which is the
5 risk posed by the monoline wrapper. That, I believe -- you
6 know, the point there is that, in looking at my analysis of the
7 Giants Stadium LLC from a credit perspective, I relied on the
8 Moody's report that was dated on September 17th, I believe.
9 And Moody's published that rating of Baa3 with a stable outlook
10 at that point in time. The reason why they granted the rating
11 at that time was because the -- excuse me, the monoline
12 wrapper, which I believe was FGIC, had been downgraded below
13 investment grade. And as you can see in my declaration and in
14 the Moody's report, they very clearly set out -- and this is my
15 experience as well, they clearly set out that a rating on a
16 security that is wrapped will either be rated by the underlying
17 rating of the security or the wrapper's rating, whichever is
18 higher. And at this point in time, as a result of the Moody's
19 analysis that was published on September 17th, the Giants
20 Stadium LLC was rated investment grade in the specific
21 categories Baa3, which was higher than the underlying monoline
22 wrapper. So that's -- that was something that -- the fact that
23 the monoline wrapper was a risk, I don't view that as being an
24 issue whatsoever.

25 We already discussed a little bit previously the fact that

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1 there wasn't a broker-dealer in place to conduct the auctions
2 as of the closing date. And as I mentioned, you know, I
3 believe that it was, you know, highly knowable that as of the
4 closing date that an auction agent would have been put in
5 place. And as I pointed out already, the auction agent was --
6 I'm sorry, the broker-dealer of Goldman Sachs was appointed on
7 September -- I'm sorry, November 14th, and the bonds had
8 already been written up, you know, substantially by prior to
9 that date. Once again, it was also knowable that the Giants
10 had the ability to redeem the securities as of the closing
11 date, if one had looked at the offering documents.

12 And then lastly, you know, market conditions in the
13 auction-rate securities market I don't believe were any
14 different between September 22nd as of 12:01 and, you know,
15 later periods of time. You know, in fact if you look at the
16 overall corporate-bond market indices, the overall corporate-
17 bond market dropped by approximately, like, six percent or so
18 in terms of price valuation.

19 Q. Moving now to the other part of the analysis. You've
20 described your Giants Stadium analysis; you've described your
21 view of Barclays' calculation of the Giants Stadium bonds.
22 Let's turn to the other aspect, the other eighteen bonds that
23 were included in your analysis. Can you give us a high-level
24 description of how you went about valuing those bonds?

25 A. Yes. What I did for these securities, as I mentioned

1 before, the -- I looked for observable market pricing data in
2 the market; specifically, there is a pricing source of actual
3 transactions, referred to as TRACE, which is, I believe,
4 regulated by the SEC and operated by FINRA. And I found -- I
5 looked at the overall trading activity for September 19th of
6 the entire universe of corporate bonds, and then I specifically
7 looked for the CUSIPs that I was requested to value and where I
8 saw valuation -- where I saw trades of institutional size for
9 those particular CUSIPs. Then I utilized those observable
10 prices in my analysis.

11 In -- you know, in addition, with the exception of those
12 four securities that I valued in that fashion, the other
13 fourteen basically used a simple discounted cash flow
14 methodology, and I utilized different models depending on the
15 specifics of that security. And the inputs for those models
16 that I utilized were, you know, various inputs that any market
17 participant would use, including interest rates, maturities,
18 frequency of payments. But the key -- one of the key factors
19 is that in a discounted cash flow analysis for a corporate
20 bond, one needs to look at the credit risk of that corporate
21 bond relative to the risk-free rates of interest.

22 And then lastly, what I attempted to do was, in order to
23 limit the areas of disagreement, I utilized the same liquidity
24 adjustment that Barclays used for all these eighteen corporate
25 bonds. So as a result, for twelve of the securities, I didn't

1 make a liquidity adjustment, because those liquidity
2 adjustment -- I'm sorry, because the bid price was incorporated
3 in the -- in my analysis. And then for the balance of the
4 securities, I took a conservative approach, I thought, of
5 utilizing the same liquidity discounts or adjustments that
6 (sic) you will as Barclays did. So that would have been up to
7 ten percent on what I would consider a structured note.

8 Q. Now, what was Barclays' approach, if you could discern it,
9 in terms of how they went about determining values for the
10 corporate bonds?

11 A. Barclays -- it appears to me, from reading the
12 documentation, that they went to third-party market providers
13 for sources of prices, and when they were able to get third-
14 party prices they utilized the lowest of those third-party
15 prices. And by reading through the documentation, it appears
16 that if there was no third-party price available, then Barclays
17 would use the PCG price of 9/19 -- of September 19th, I should
18 say. And if there was no September 19th price available to
19 Barclays -- from Barclays, then they would use the Bank of New
20 York pricing.

21 But there's -- you know, I'd say that looks to be as the
22 general methodology, but there's one, you know, stark example,
23 which is slide 17, which I think is probably worth mentioning
24 here. In this particular security, the issuer's Intelsat
25 (Bermuda). This security -- there were no third-party prices

1 available to Barclays, according to the spreadsheets that I
2 looked at. Barclays did have a Bank of New York price of
3 eighty-eight and a half; that was available to them. They did
4 not have their own September 19th price. They valued the
5 security, in the documents that I looked at, at zero; or the
6 position, which is a fifteen million dollar position.

7 And, you know, I'd also point out that they did mark up
8 the security to a price of fifty-six from zero in a declining
9 market. And this -- you know, I'd really call it a mistake.
10 You know, if you will, it was a ten million dollar mistake.
11 And of the thirty-two million dollars of undervaluation for
12 these other securities of eighteen bonds, this particular
13 situation, you know, accounts for ten million of that thirty-
14 two million.

15 Q. And I take it your specific valuations for the other bond,
16 putting aside the Intelsat bond, those are set forth in your
17 expert report?

18 A. Yes. Yeah, the methodology is set forth in the report,
19 and it's consistent, you know, throughout the entire -- all the
20 securities.

21 Q. And you used a discounted cash flow analysis to value this
22 particular bond?

23 A. Yes, I did.

24 MR. TAMBE: If I may consult for a moment? I think
25 I'm almost done.

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1 THE COURT: Sure.

2 (Pause)

3 MR. TAMBE: No further questions on direct. Thank
4 you.

5 Thank you, Mr. Olvany.

6 THE COURT: All right, thank you.

7 Cross-examine?

8 (Pause)

9 THE COURT: Please proceed.

10 CROSS-EXAMINATION

11 BY MR. THOMAS:

12 Q. Good morning, Mr. Olvany. My name is Todd Thomas. I'm
13 with the law firm of Boies, Schiller & Flexner and I represent
14 Barclays in this matter.

15 A. Good morning.

16 Q. You work in the same office as Mr. Slattery and Mr. Garvey
17 of Chicago Partners, is that right?

18 A. Yes. When I'm in the office, yes.

19 Q. Okay. And -- so you've been with Chicago Partners since
20 approximately December 2008?

21 A. Yeah, I am -- I work with Chicago Partners. I'm an
22 independent consultant to Chicago Partners.

23 Q. Okay. And in your prior employment history with Credit
24 Suisse and Barclays -- and, excuse me, Morgan Stanley, when you
25 say you were responsible for valuing securities in your former

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1 jobs, you mean that as a salesperson you would discuss the
2 value of securities with clients and traders and you would
3 sometimes give your opinion on the value of the securities
4 along with the opinions of your clients and traders, correct?

5 A. I would do independent analysis, you know, as well, and
6 come to conclusions on valuations of securities by doing
7 independent analysis by myself as -- in addition to some of the
8 points that you mentioned.

9 Q. Okay. But the traders would actually do the initial
10 evaluations, and then you might comment on them in the course
11 of discussions with clients, correct?

12 A. I don't think that that's an inaccurate assessment. I
13 mean, it depends on the circumstances of -- you know, when
14 you're valuing securities, you're doing it on an everyday
15 basis, and oftentimes a client will come to you and say, you
16 know, 'I'm interested in buying' or 'selling X security', and
17 you will come to -- you know, you will do some analysis even
18 prior to discussing it with the trading desk.

19 Q. But it was the traders who were putting the initial mark
20 on the security, correct?

21 A. Well, you're distinguishing two -- potentially two things
22 when you say "mark". I don't know what -- exactly what you
23 mean by "mark", but valuation takes place every single day. As
24 a salesperson, you're -- you know, you spend all of your time
25 discussing with clients, you know, what the value is of

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1 securities every single day.

2 Q. It wasn't your responsibility to come up with a valuation
3 for that security? It was the trader who had done that,
4 correct?

5 A. The eventual price that a transaction would take place in,
6 you know, would be determined by the traders. Yes.

7 Q. And ultimately, in quoting prices to your clients, you
8 would one hundred percent of the time end up just quoting your
9 traders' prices to your clients, correct?

10 A. I don't think that that's an accurate assessment of --
11 when you say "quoting a price", you can give you opinion to
12 your client about a price. The price that eventually is
13 transacted at is -- has to be agreed upon by your client as
14 well as the trader. But salespeople are an integral part of
15 that process of developing a valuation assessment for
16 securities.

17 Q. Do you recall being deposed in this matter?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. In your binder, would you please turn to tab 1, which is a
20 copy of your deposition, and page 23, line 21?

21 A. Just give me a minute, please, to get there.

22 Q. Absolutely.

23 A. Page 23 on the bottom or on the --

24 Q. On the top corner.

25 A. (Pause). Okay, 23, line what?

1 Q. Line 21.

2 A. Um-hum.

3 Q. And do you see there you're asked:

4 "Q. As I understand your testimony, you said the traders were
5 one source of prices that you would quote to clients --

6 "A. Uh-huh.

7 "Q. -- and that you also had your own -- you used your own
8 opinion on the prices?

9 "A. Uh-huh.

10 "Q. What I'm asking is generally what percentage of the time
11 did you end up just quoting the traders' price to your client?

12 "A. As one hundred percent of the time."

13 Q. Was that answer truthful and correct?

14 A. Yes, I think that what you're -- what we're referring to
15 here is a slightly -- is a nuance within what we're talking
16 about. There's -- specifically what I'm speaking about, I
17 believe, here is the process of, you know, providing periodic
18 pricing to clients, not the process of doing transactions in
19 the normal course of business.

20 Q. You don't have any experience with repurchase agreements,
21 correct?

22 A. Pardon?

23 Q. You don't have any experience with repurchase agreements,
24 correct?

25 A. I know of them, but -- and I've done some, but not very

1 many.

2 Q. You were not operating in the market for corporate bonds
3 as of September 19th, 2008, correct?

4 A. That's correct. I was working with Navigant at that point
5 in time.

6 Q. And you do not have an accounting background, correct?

7 A. No, I do not.

8 Q. Okay. And you're not certain of what the term "fair
9 value" means, right?

10 A. From an accounting perspective, I don't know exactly what
11 fair value means. What I've -- what I -- you know, I've had
12 discussions with some of my colleagues about it, about what
13 fair value means, but where I'm coming from is looking at a,
14 you know, market valuation.

15 MR. THOMAS: And if you could put up Exhibit 2 to his
16 report, which is at tab 2.

17 Q. And this is a chart of the twenty-two securities that you
18 valued, correct?

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. Now, of the 517 corporate bonds that went from Lehman to
21 Barclays, you valued 16, is that correct?

22 A. There's 517 bonds that would have been included -- or
23 identified by Barclays as corporate bonds, but some of the
24 bonds that I valued in this matter did not come under that
25 category, by Barclays, of that 517. So that's the first thing.

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1 And then -- but these 22 bonds are the 22 bonds that I valued
2 in this matter, and some of them were identified by Barclays
3 under slightly different categories.

4 Q. But approximately 500 of the other corporate bonds that
5 went over to Barclays were valued by Mr. Slattery and Mr. --
6 Professor Zmijewski of Chicago Partners, using different
7 valuation methods, correct?

8 A. That's correct.

9 Q. And as I understood it, part of your selection criteria
10 for which bonds you valued using your different method was that
11 there was at least a million-dollar difference between the
12 Barclays valuation and the BoNY valuation, is that correct?

13 A. That's correct, with the exception, as I mentioned before,
14 of the Giants Stadium LLC bonds where Barclays and Bank of New
15 York had the same price.

16 Q. That's an exception. So on the other ones, the corporate
17 bonds, the universe you valued were the ones where there's a
18 difference between Barclays and BoNY, correct?

19 A. That was the original grouping of securities, and then, as
20 I mentioned in my previous testimony, there was a group of
21 securities that I didn't feel that I had adequate information
22 in order to value the securities using my methodology, which,
23 as a result of that, were valued by some of the other experts
24 in this matter.

25 Q. Now, Professor Slattery -- I mean Mr. Slattery, when he

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1 would value his larger set of corporate bonds, if he didn't
2 find a third-party price, he would use the BoNY price, right?

3 A. I'm not a hundred percent sure of that.

4 Q. And if that was his method and he applied that to your
5 bonds, there would likely be less of a valuation difference
6 with the Barclays valuation and the Chicago Partners valuation,
7 correct?

8 A. I didn't do any analysis like that, so I can't comment on
9 that.

10 Q. So you didn't analyze whether applying Mr. Slattery or
11 Professor Zmijewski's approach to your group of sixteen bonds
12 would result in a lower valuation than the Barclays valuation?

13 A. I didn't do any analysis like that.

14 Q. Okay. And who chose to cut up the bonds this way with
15 different people using different methods to value different
16 sets of bonds?

17 A. As I mentioned, when we -- when the group of securities
18 were originally sorted out by that million-dollar differential,
19 with the exception of Giants Stadium, then there were certain
20 securities that were backed by corporate -- corporation cash
21 flows that I consider to be a corporate bond. And so that's --
22 I elected to price those particular securities.

23 Q. Did you look at all 517 corporate bonds that came over and
24 pick a certain amount of bonds you were going to value?

25 A. No. As I mentioned, we did this original sort; then there

1 was a certain number of securities that came out of that. And
2 then from that universe of securities, then we attempted to
3 provide valuations of those.

4 Q. Who's making the call on this original sort that you refer
5 to?

6 A. I be -- I'm not a hundred percent sure, but I believe Mr.
7 Slattery and, you know, in conjunction with some of the other
8 experts, you know, came up with the original sort, if you will.

9 Q. And you have no understanding and you did no analysis of
10 how Chicago Partners' valuation would be different if the
11 sorting was done differently?

12 A. No, I do not.

13 Q. Okay. Hypothetically, if Mr. Slattery, in valuing
14 corporate bonds, used -- would use third-party vendor prices
15 and where those were not available he would use the BoNY
16 prices, would you consider that a regional -- reasonable
17 approach to valuing corporate bonds?

18 A. There's a lot of different methodologies that one could
19 use for valuing corporate bonds. And, you know, Mr. Slattery's
20 methodology -- I wasn't asked to opine on that. But there are
21 different meth -- different experts can have different
22 methodologies for valuing bonds.

23 Q. Well, I'm asking you now if you could give me your opinion
24 on whether the methodology I just described of using third-
25 party prices and, when those aren't available, using BoNY

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1 prices, would that be a reasonable approach to valuation?

2 A. Yeah, I think, hypothetically speaking, I think that's a
3 reasonable approach, yes.

4 Q. And if Barclays did it, it would be reasonable for
5 Barclays too, right?

6 A. Yeah, if another expert -- I'm sorry, if another
7 valuation, you know, person did it, it would be reasonable.
8 But I believe that my valuation of doing a ground-up analysis
9 is more robust. You know, I haven't used that term earlier,
10 but my valuation of looking at the individual securities would
11 be more robust when you can do that.

12 Q. On the corporate bonds, you attempted to find transaction
13 prices, is that right --

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. -- for the actual bonds? And for the ones you found
16 transaction prices in TRACE, you used the transaction price, is
17 that right?

18 A. I used -- in one of the transaction prices, yes.

19 Q. Okay. And there were about four of the sixteen corporate
20 bonds that you found using TRACE?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Okay. And for the others, did you use other reported
23 transaction prices for those bonds, or did you create a model
24 for valuing them?

25 A. I used a method -- I used -- not prices for those

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1 particular securities, but I used a combination of credit
2 default swaps and what's referred to as a corporate-bond basis,
3 in order to come up with market inputs, in addition to interest
4 rates, volatility and other aspects of it, in order to come up
5 with valuations.

6 Q. If we could turn to tab 27, please.

7 MR. THOMAS: And let's go ahead and put that on the
8 screen.

9 Q. Now, this demonstrative is our attempt to try to show some
10 of the methods, assumptions and judgments that are involved in
11 your methodology as described in Appendix 3 to your report.
12 And I'm not going to go through all of these, but as an initial
13 matter, would you agree that the bonds that you valued, using
14 your methodology approach as opposed to market prices, involved
15 a lot of assumptions and judgments?

16 A. It included looking at observable market data and using my
17 experience to know what I believe to be the appropriate market
18 data to look at. So that would be a judgment, you know, in my
19 opinion. And there, you know, were other -- there were other
20 factors as well that -- and the assumption of using -- you
21 know, which market data to use, I think, would be another
22 example of an assumption.

23 Q. There were quite a few assumptions you had to make to put
24 into your model in order to come up with a figure, correct?

25 A. I mean, which is consistent with what a market participant

1 would do on any particular day or end of a reporting period as
2 far as valuing a corporate bond. There is -- utilizing
3 observable market information in the form of some of the inputs
4 that I mentioned, and then using your judgments of exper --
5 with experience and market assumptions for things like default
6 rates -- I'm sorry, recovery rates, you know, would be another
7 thing.

8 Q. Do you know if, in valuing the twenty-two CUSIPs you
9 valued, if you attempted to value them using September 22nd
10 pricing or market information, if that would affect your
11 valuation, as opposed to using September 19th market valu --
12 market information?

13 A. The market -- yeah, prices, generally speaking, move from
14 day to day. So I -- so exactly what was the question?

15 Q. If you -- instead of using September 19th market
16 information as input into your valuation process, if you had
17 used September 22nd market information, would that have changed
18 your valuation?

19 A. Depends on the security, but potentially yes.

20 Q. Have you done an analysis of that?

21 A. No.

22 Q. Okay. And on this chart here at tab 27, there's a big
23 blue box on the right referring to pricing mechanisms. Is it
24 accurate that you used four different pricing mechanisms for
25 different bonds?

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1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Okay. And can you explain why you did four different
3 mechanisms for various bonds?

4 A. Sure. The -- first of all, TRACE, as I mentioned, is not
5 a -- it is observable pricing information, so that's why I used
6 that there. And for each one of these securities, different
7 models have different limitations, and each security has
8 different characteristics to it. So, depending on whether or
9 not the security has a fixed coupon, a floating coupon, has any
10 optionality to the bond, whether the coupon will switch from
11 fixed to floating, there's different models in pricing
12 mechanisms that I elected to use depending on the limitations
13 of those particular securit -- those particular models.

14 Q. Did you do any analysis of how your valuation would be
15 different if you had used the same pricing mechanism across the
16 board or had used different pricing mechanisms with respect to
17 different bonds?

18 A. No, I did not.

19 Q. Okay. If you would turn to tab 11 in your binder, please.

20 MR. THOMAS: And if we could put this on the board.

21 Q. And this is a chart where we tried to pull together the
22 valuations you come up with using your methods and some of the
23 other available prices and values in the market. And so in
24 coming up with your valuations, am I right that you did not
25 consider or factor in third-party vendor prices?

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1 A. That's correct.

2 Q. Okay. So that's true even when you had -- when you
3 couldn't find a trade price in TRACE, which was true of twelve
4 of the sixteen (you could find a trade price), for those you
5 did not go in with their market information and look at what
6 the bond was actually trading for at that date, correct?

7 A. That's not an accurate statement. I mean, a pricing
8 vendor is not a demonstration of where the bond is trading that
9 day; it's a -- you know, my understanding of a pricing vendor's
10 business, which I've never been in a pricing vendor, is simply
11 that: It's a price that is full of assumptions and judgments
12 of whatever the methodology is. So that -- those are not
13 accurately price, you know --

14 Q. Okay, I'll --

15 A. -- actually traded prices.

16 Q. -- I'll change it from price to value. Did you go and
17 factor in other values given for that bond on that day by
18 third-party pricing sources?

19 A. I actually -- you know, I created my prices, I -- and I
20 had those prices in -- I had those prices calculated, and --
21 but I didn't use the third-party prices as part of the
22 analysis. But I actually obtained some third-party prices of
23 securities where they were available, you know, whether it
24 would be in the Barclays data that was produced or not.

25 MR. THOMAS: If we could pull up -- highlight the

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1 first few lines there and just take a look at a few of these.

2 Q. So on the first CUSIP, just so we're reading this right,
3 your price -- your value given in the valuation you calculate
4 in your report would be the 33.7; and then for this particular
5 bond, the BoNY mark would be 10; and then a third-party price
6 from value from market would be 20; and then EIV (ph.), 20; and
7 then FTID, 16; and then market, 14.8; and EIV, 15 again; and BP
8 data LD2P (ph.), 14.9. Do you have any explanation for, like,
9 for instance in this bond, why your value would be higher than
10 the range of values by other parties?

11 A. Based solely on my recollection of what this CUSIP number
12 is, because it's hard to recollect exactly what the CUSIP
13 number is, my understanding is that that is a bond issued by
14 AIG. And I'd say that -- and if my memory serves me correct on
15 this security, which it would probably be worthwhile to look at
16 the specifics of what the security is, it is a rather complex
17 security issued by AIG, if it's the one I'm thinking about.

18 So I think that my valuation of the security, you know,
19 took into consideration some of the very intricate aspects of
20 this security, using market inputs. And -- but, yes, is my
21 price higher than the other prices? Yes, that's correct.

22 Q. Could those other valuations be reasonable for that
23 security?

24 A. I can't comment on what those other valuations are. I
25 don't know how they came up with those other valuations. But,

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1 you know, the different -- different market participants can
2 have different reasons for having those secur -- you know,
3 coming up with that price.

4 Q. Did you do -- let me ask you, do you think it will be
5 reasonable for a market participant valuing the security to
6 take into consideration the third-party pricing value
7 information available in the market on that security as of that
8 point in time?

9 A. I'm sorry, what's the question?

10 Q. Would it be reasonable for a valuer of these securities to
11 take into consideration this type of market information about
12 prices or values for that security?

13 A. Yeah, it would be reasonable for somebody to do that. You
14 know, my valuation of this security in -- is, you know, based
15 on my methodology.

16 Q. Okay. Did you do any systematic analysis of how your
17 values that you came up with through your modeling compared to
18 price transactions -- to values quoted by third parties in the
19 marketplace?

20 A. No.

21 Q. Did you do any analysis of how your price -- your value
22 for these bonds -- and you valued them as of September 19th,
23 2008, is that right?

24 A. No, I valued them as of 12:01 on September 22nd, using the
25 data that was available to me, which was the end of day on the

1 19th of September.

2 Q. So in attempting to value them at 12:01 on September 22nd,
3 you used as a proxy their value that you calculated as of
4 September 19th, using September 19th market information,
5 correct?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Okay. Did you do any analysis of how your value for these
8 bonds compared to the values for that same bond on that same
9 day on September 19th in the Lehman GFS system?

10 A. No, I didn't.

11 Q. Why not just take the value in GFS and use that for your
12 valuation?

13 A. Because I was -- what I was asked to do is value the
14 securities using my experience and expertise. And by using my
15 experience and expertise, I wanted to use the most robust
16 valuation methodology that I could come up with on the
17 securities that I had information available to me.

18 Q. Okay. And if we could go back to Exhibit 2, which is --
19 to your report, which is tab 2.

20 MR. THOMAS: And pull that back up.

21 Q. Now, how -- on the corporate bonds -- on the sixteen
22 corporate bonds, how many of them was Lehman the issuer on?

23 A. Was Lehman the issuer on?

24 Q. Yes.

25 A. In other word -- oh, okay. The CUSIPs that all -- if my

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1 memory serves me correct, the CUSIPs that all start with 525.
2 So there's three.

3 Q. Okay. And those bonds eventually defaulted, right?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. And when was the -- when did LBI go into liquidation?

6 A. The -- when -- I'm sorry, what's the question?

7 Q. When did LBI go into liquidation?

8 A. The filing of the bankruptcy date -- I mean, these bonds
9 were trading in TRACE, you know, on that day, and these three
10 bonds were all valued using prices that were traded on that
11 partic -- on September 19th. And there was observable market
12 information for all Lehman securities on that day, and there
13 was active trading in the bonds that day.

14 Q. Do you know what day LBI went into liquidation?

15 A. No, I don't.

16 Q. Did you do anything to try to -- in your valuation of the
17 Lehman-issued bonds, did you do anything to try to account for
18 the LBI SIPC liquidation?

19 A. As I said, the first place that I looked for, for the
20 securities that I looked at, was observable market prices; and
21 for Lehman's bonds, there was active -- active trading on that
22 particular date. And if you look at my reliance material,
23 you'll see that for these particular securities, there was, you
24 know, many trades that took place on that day. So my first
25 source of information was observable market data.

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1 Q. So these securities, did you value based upon observed
2 trade prices or did you value using your methodology?

3 A. Observed trade prices.

4 Q. Okay. And what would their value be if you had used the
5 valuation methodology you used for twelve of the sixteen?

6 A. I don't have an answer to that question, because my first
7 source was actual trade information.

8 Q. Okay. And you would have had --

9 A. And just for the -- just to point out, those, you know,
10 those four -- those three securities, you can see that my
11 valuation was actually lower than Barclays' valuation.

12 Q. Right. And why -- how did Barclays come up with its
13 valuation?

14 A. The way it looked -- the way it looked from -- how did
15 Barclays come up with their valuation? I don't recall
16 specifically --

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. -- on that bond -- on those bonds.

19 Q. And in fact, if Barclays were following a process which
20 led to a higher valuation on those bonds, but the bonds ended
21 up being worthless -- strike that.

22 If you had done your valuation approach to valuing those
23 bonds, you would have had to take into account the credit risk
24 of the bonds, correct?

25 A. There -- you would use observable market data for those

1 particular bonds.

2 Q. Well, because it's available. I'm asking, if you had used
3 your valuation methodology, which you used on most of the
4 corporate bonds, you would have had to account for the credit
5 risk associated with the issuer, which is Lehman, right?

6 A. You -- that's incorporated in the market inputs, you know,
7 the price -- the pricing input.

8 Q. Exactly. So by using TRACE on these three bonds, you
9 avoided that, correct?

10 A. Well, as I said, the most reliable source of information,
11 you know, on pricing, in my opinion, would be observable market
12 prices for the securities that you can find observable market
13 prices. And for, you know, these three CUSIPs within -- of
14 Barclays -- I'm sorry, of Lehman Brothers, you know, there was
15 a robust amount of information in the market place about where
16 those bonds were trading on that particular day. And so for
17 each individual CUSIP I analyzed, you know, how much traded
18 that particular day. And then, what I did was take the number
19 of observances that were out in the market, because believe it
20 or not -- believe it or not, these -- a couple of these Lehman
21 bonds traded at par that day. And so I wanted -- and they
22 traded -- some of them traded from a range of 12 to par. And
23 so in order to do a more accurate evaluation of those
24 particular securities, what I did was take the -- all the
25 observations and then take sixty percent of the observations

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1 that were available and then take the low trade within those
2 sixty percent of observations. And I thought that that was a
3 conservative utilization of the data.

4 Q. On the 296 million dollar valuation you have for the
5 covered bonds, you did not make a liquidity adjustment to that
6 amount, did you?

7 A. Yes, I did.

8 Q. You did?

9 A. Yeah.

10 Q. And --

11 A. I utilized the same -- I utilized the same liquidity
12 adjustment for those corporate bonds that -- I'm sorry -- for
13 those covered bonds that Lehman -- that Barclays did, which
14 was, as I said in my previous comments, was I believe, ninety-
15 five percent.

16 Q. So, I'm sorry --

17 A. Any -- sorry.

18 Q. -- you're saying you took a five percent liquidity
19 adjustment for the corporate bonds?

20 A. No, I didn't say that. I said -- you asked me for that
21 specific security, the one that was 200-odd million --

22 Q. Well --

23 A. -- which is CUSIP number 057.

24 Q. -- no, no. I'm talking about the total for this -- for
25 the sixteen corporate bonds. Excuse me, I said 296. I should

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1 have said 298 million, going back up. Corporate bonds -- the
2 sixteen corporate bonds that you valued at 298 million dollars
3 and that Barclays' valuation you cite there as 269 million
4 dollars. Do you see that?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Now, for those sixteen bonds, you did not take a liquidity
7 discount or liquidity adjustment, correct?

8 A. That's incorrect.

9 Q. Okay. What percentage --

10 A. Let me just -- why don't we go back to my direct testimony
11 for a second, just to clear this up. What I used --

12 Q. Well, can you --

13 A. -- as a liquidity adjustment --

14 Q. -- sir, can you tell me without going back --

15 A. I'm sorry.

16 Q. -- to the materials that were presented and handed out
17 today what percentage liquidity adjustment did you take with
18 respect to the corporate bonds?

19 A. I used -- I utilized the exact same -- for each CUSIP, I
20 used the exact same liquidity adjustment that Barclays used for
21 each one of those particular CUSIPs.

22 Q. Okay. And what do you understand Barclays' liquidity
23 adjustment to be for those CUSIPs -- for the --

24 A. For some of them, it was ten percent -- or ninety percent.
25 For some of them it was ninety-five; some of them it was

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1 ninety-seven; and some of it was a hundred percent.

2 Q. When you're saying ninety-seven, do you mean a ninety-
3 seven percent liquidity adjustment?

4 A. No, the other way around; ninety percent of the value. So
5 in other words -- in other words, a zero percent for some, a
6 three percent for others, a five percent for others, and a ten
7 percent for others.

8 Q. Now, at the time of your deposition, you did not believe
9 that Barclays had made a liquidity adjustment for those
10 corporate bonds, correct?

11 A. Well, I think that what we're getting into here is a
12 differential between what Barclays classified bonds as and what
13 I classified bonds as. There are certain bonds within the
14 Bar -- within the Barclays universe that I classified as
15 corporate bonds. Some of these bonds were identified by
16 Barclays as emerging market bonds; some of these bonds were
17 identified by Barclays as, you know, in what was called the
18 PMTG tab; and some of them were classified by Barclays under
19 the agency tab. So each one -- what Barclays considered to be
20 a corporate bond and I considered to be a corporate bond,
21 that's where they didn't take a liquidity adjustment.

22 Q. Okay. Of your sixteen bonds that you list as corporate
23 bonds, how many of those are traded by Barclays as corporate
24 bonds?

25 A. In my recollection is, it's twelve.

1 Q. Okay. And which --

2 A. Excluding the Giants Stadiums.

3 Q. And of the twelve corporate bonds that you characterize as
4 corporate bonds and Barclays characterizes as corporate bonds,
5 did you take a liquidity adjustment on those bonds?

6 A. I -- as I said, I utilized the same -- my -- I utilized
7 the same liquidity adjustment that Barclays utilized. Inherent
8 in my methodology was a bid side valuation, you know, of those
9 securities. So I utilized -- I utilized their liquidity
10 adjustment across the board. And so that would include, you
11 know, both the securities that had a liquidity adjustment, as
12 well as the securities that didn't have a liquidity adjustment.
13 And all of my valuations were done based on market information
14 that incorporated -- or market data that incorporated bid side
15 valuations.

16 Q. At the time of your deposition, you did not believe that
17 Barclays had done a liquidity adjustment for those bonds,
18 correct?

19 A. No, that's in -- for -- as I said, for the bonds that they
20 classified as corporate bonds, that's correct.

21 Q. But for the twelve bonds that we're now talking about, you
22 understood, at the time of your deposition, that they had not
23 done a liquidity adjustment?

24 A. That's correct.

25 Q. Right. At some point later in time, you realized that

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1 Barclays had accounted for liquidity by taking the lowest
2 available vendor price instead of subsequently making a
3 liquidity adjustment. Is that correct?

4 A. I was -- you know, I read that document, the BO, the sell
5 that we're referring to and, you know, had an understanding of
6 what that meant. And that was the rationale that they used for
7 that.

8 Q. You understood that after your deposition, right?

9 A. I kind of understood it --

10 Q. Yeah.

11 A. -- you know, both times.

12 Q. Right. At the time when you made your report and your
13 calculations, you had the impression that Barclays did not make
14 a liquidity adjustment to those total bonds, correct?

15 A. Well, they didn't make a liquidity adjustment aside from
16 their methodology, which was -- they believed, based on some of
17 the testimony that I've seen and some of the information, that
18 by utilizing the low bid of the third-party market providers.
19 And I'd point out that in the case of that bond that is up
20 there, where they have a zero valuation, you know, there
21 they're taking a -- they don't have any valuation at all and,
22 you know, they didn't take a market -- they didn't take a
23 liquidity adjustment on that.

24 Q. Okay. After you learned that Barclays actually had
25 adjusted for liquidity by using the lowest available price and

1 treating that as a proxy for a liquidity adjustment, did you go
2 back and change your valuation in any way for those twelve
3 bonds?

4 A. No.

5 Q. And you did not apply the value that you ended up with in
6 your model, you did not discount that for liquidity purposes?

7 A. For the twelve securities that we're talking about, the
8 liquidity was -- or the bid side valuation was incorporated in
9 the valuation technique.

10 Q. Okay. And what exactly does that mean, "the bid side"?
11 Did you go out and get a whole bunch of different prices like
12 Barclays did and took the lowest price?

13 A. No. In the market inputs that I used, right, which I
14 mentioned to you previously, which included the -- an
15 adjustment for the credit risk, you know, of the individual
16 securities, it was incorporated in that.

17 Q. How was it incorporated in that?

18 A. In the -- you know, in the valuation -- I'm sorry, in the
19 bid side of the default characteristics of the bond.

20 Q. What does that mean, "incorporated in there"? Were you
21 anticipating that Barclays was doing a liquidity adjustment so
22 I have to do that as well?

23 A. No, I was using the market information that was available
24 to me that was a bid side valuation. So it's incorporated in
25 the bond basis data -- I'm sorry, the corporate-bond basis

1 data.

2 Q. Okay. So we know what Barclays did. Barclays observed
3 prices in the market and then took the lowest and treated that
4 as the mid-to-bid adjustment. What you did, precisely, is
5 what?

6 A. I took the -- using the market available information I
7 used bid side inputs into that in order to come up with my
8 valuations.

9 Q. What does that mean "used bid side" -- could you give me
10 an example?

11 A. Yeah. As I mentioned before, it is incorporated in the
12 default characteristics, the corporate-bond basis trading
13 information is in there as well as the CES information.

14 Q. So you adjusted some value to make it come up with a lower
15 value in order to adjust for liquidity issues in the market?

16 A. I used the bid side that was available to me.

17 Q. And using the bid side that's available to you, what
18 precise data did you use?

19 A. The -- as I said the Morgan Stanley Corporate Basis Report
20 information.

21 Q. Okay. And so that means you're using -- how does that --
22 that impacts your model in what way?

23 A. It changes the default probability of the security, which,
24 in a discounted cash flow analysis, what we mentioned before is
25 that you have to take the characteristic security, discount it

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1 for a risk-free rate, and then, you know, add to that discount
2 something for the credit risk. And that impact was
3 incorporated in that discount for credit risk.

4 Q. And it's your testimony that you did that with an eye
5 towards making this a proxy for a liquidity adjustment?

6 A. For a proxy for the bid side of the market.

7 Q. But was it a proxy for making a liquidity adjustment?

8 A. I -- you know -- I mean, my valuation was to try to come
9 up with a bid side valuation.

10 Q. Okay. Again, was it with an eye towards accounting for a
11 liquidity adjustment that would need to be made in order to
12 value these bonds?

13 A. It was -- you know, it's the bid that -- liquidity
14 adjustment would incorporate trying to value things on the bid
15 side of the market, in my opinion.

16 Q. You would agree with me that the appropriate valuation,
17 when valuing these bonds, is the exit price that would take
18 into consideration liquidity issues, correct?

19 A. Yeah -- or the bid side of the market, yes.

20 MR. THOMAS: Your Honor, it's about 11 a.m. I
21 think -- I don't know if this is a --

22 THE COURT: It's actually a little past. It's a
23 little past 11 a.m.

24 MR. THOMAS: Sorry.

25 THE COURT: It's a good time for a morning break. But

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1 I'd be interested in your estimate of about how much more you
2 think you have?

3 MR. THOMAS: I think --

4 THE COURT: Not to hold you to it, but I'm just trying
5 to get a sense.

6 MR. THOMAS: -- yes, Your Honor. I think
7 approximately one hour.

8 THE COURT: Okay. Let's take a break till twenty
9 after 11.

10 (Recess from 11:07 a.m. until 11:29 a.m.)

11 THE CLERK: All rise.

12 THE COURT: Be seated, please. And please proceed.

13 RESUMED CROSS-EXAMINATION

14 BY MR. THOMAS:

15 Q. Mr. Olvany, we've been discussing whether you accounted
16 for liquidity conditions in the market with respect to the
17 twelve corporate bonds that we've been discussing. And I'd
18 like to ask you to turn to page -- tab 2, paragraph 36 of your
19 report.

20 MR. THOMAS: If we could pull that up, please?

21 A. I have it.

22 Q. If you see paragraph 36, you're talking about the large
23 group of sixteen corporate bonds that would include the twelve
24 bonds we've been discussing?

25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. And do you see the last sentence? It says, "Consistent
2 with Barclays' methodology described below, I did not reduce
3 the valuation of the corporate bonds to reflect liquidity
4 conditions in the market." Is that a true statement?

5 A. Yeah, I think that that's -- yes, I think it's a true
6 statement.

7 Q. And at the time you wrote that, you did not realize that
8 instead of taking a liquidity adjustment Barclays had instead
9 assumed a lowest price as a proxy for liquidity adjustment,
10 correct?

11 A. I was aware -- I was aware that that's what they did. I
12 think it might be instructive for the Court to look at -- to
13 look at, you know, on the same part of the report in Table 2 on
14 page 14. Table 2 on page 14 looks at the entire universe of
15 517 corporate bonds that Barclays classified as corporate
16 bonds, and you see that's got a total market valuation of about
17 1.1 billion dollars. And in the instances where there's more
18 than two prices available, that the difference between the
19 average price, you know, and -- or average value and the
20 minimum value, which is what Barclays uses, is about 20 million
21 dollars on a portfolio of 1.1 billion dollars. So it's 1.72
22 percent -- 1.71 percent.

23 Q. Do you understand my question is whether you took a
24 liquidity adjustment in your valuation? And the answer is no,
25 correct?

1 A. Yeah, I used the same liquidity adjustments that Barclays
2 used.

3 Q. To the extent -- you're saying that because you saw a
4 sheet that Barclays had where it showed the liquidity
5 adjustment rate of 1, right?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Okay. But --

8 A. For these bonds.

9 Q. -- right. But what Barclays did, instead of using a
10 liquidity adjustment, they used the lowest available price for
11 the bonds, and that was a proxy for the liquidity adjustment,
12 correct?

13 A. And as I just stated, if you look in the report, you can
14 see what the impact is of the average value, you know, for
15 those prices and the low value for those prices. And it's a
16 mere 1.72 percent.

17 Q. Okay. Didn't you --

18 A. That's the impact that Barclays -- you know, it's a small
19 impact.

20 Q. -- did you do an independent analysis of what the
21 appropriate liquidity adjustment for these bonds would be in
22 this market at that time?

23 A. I did not, no.

24 Q. Okay. And if you would turn to tab 31, please, which I
25 believe are some of your work papers.

1 A. Um-hum.

2 MR. THOMAS: And if we could pull that up -- could we
3 pull up --

4 Q. Look at the last column, please. And so you identified
5 your bond values that you used in your report as mid prices,
6 correct?

7 A. Yeah. This column, I wanted to use -- I wanted to, you
8 know, calculate, you know, their -- using Barclays'
9 methodology, their pri -- their liquidity adjustment, you know,
10 to adjust from mid to bid. But each one of those, I'd
11 mentioned, that's probably the not right -- not the correct
12 terminology to put at the top of that -- top of that column.
13 Because it was incorporated, as I said before in my previous
14 testimony -- the bid valuation is incorporated in the
15 underlying price.

16 But then, again, on the securities where there was a
17 liquidity adjustment made by Barclays, I actually reduced it
18 again by their liquidity adjustments.

19 Q. And this is BCI Exhibit 1091. Now, isn't it true that
20 what happened was that you made your valuation not thinking
21 that Barclays had made a liquidity adjustment of any kind; you
22 made no liquidity adjustment. That's why you identify it as
23 mid price. It was pointed out to you at your deposition that
24 Barclays actually had made a liquidity adjustment, and now
25 you're saying that this was just a mistake?

1 A. It was pointed out that that was what their rationale for
2 using the low price was, that, you know, in lieu of the
3 liquidity adjustment. But I don't believe that it changes my
4 opinion that all the prices that I put together were based on,
5 you know, mid -- I'm sorry, bid value adjustments, you know,
6 using this methodology.

7 Q. So that was just -- when you said mid prices, that was
8 just error?

9 A. Well, because it's -- it is -- I should have titled it
10 slightly differently in the work papers, yes.

11 Q. Now, you mentioned using TRACE data when you had that
12 available. And I think you referred to it as being real
13 transaction data. Do you see some kind of distinction between
14 using TRACE data with respect to the value of securities and
15 using other third-party vendor data with respect to that value?

16 A. Yes, I do. I -- because TRACE is actually reported trades
17 that actually take place. It has a -- it has time stamped on
18 it. And it has the transaction price. And I believe that
19 that's a -- that is real transaction data as opposed to pricing
20 sources.

21 Q. When you say "real transaction data", do you mean that's
22 like live data that's showing actual transactions?

23 A. It's reported within fifteen minutes, you know, in public
24 sources, from the time of the trade. Or at least, that's what
25 the goal is.

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1 Q. And you think using that real or live data may be more
2 reliable for obtaining market information than using historical
3 third-party prices?

4 A. Yes, I do.

5 Q. So if Barclays felt that way also, you wouldn't disagree
6 with that?

7 A. No, I don't.

8 Q. If we could go back -- on the covered bonds -- if we could
9 pull back Exhibit 3 to your report, please? The covered bonds,
10 the difference there between your valuation and Barclays' was
11 only about one percent. Is that right?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And Barclays based its valuation for these bonds based
14 upon prices or valuations observed in the marketplace, correct?

15 A. I believe they used third-party prices on those as well.

16 Q. Okay. And you calculated your value using, among other
17 things, secondary market spreads for comparable securities
18 acquired from contemporaneous market research?

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. And did you decide what were comparable securities?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Now, ninety percent of your valuation difference comes
23 from the Giants bonds, correct?

24 A. That's correct.

25 Q. And as of September 22, 2008 -- the valuation date here --

1 vendor pricing was not available for these securities, correct?

2 A. Yes. That's my understanding.

3 Q. And the auction-rate securities market was not functioning
4 as it had historically, correct?

5 A. That's correct.

6 Q. And Barclays did not have an auction-rate securities desk
7 as of that time, correct?

8 A. That's correct.

9 Q. And the Giants bonds were not part of the fed repo. Is
10 that right?

11 A. I don't know.

12 Q. Do you know if Barclays was expecting to receive these
13 bonds?

14 A. I don't know.

15 Q. Now, you used a model to value the Giants bonds, correct?

16 A. Well, I used -- I used a model to elaborate on my pricing
17 of these securities. But I developed my view of a hundred
18 percent of face value as the price for these bonds. And then
19 what I did was I tested that price using a couple of different
20 methodologies that essentially are discounted cash flow
21 methodologies using a set of assumptions that was, I thought,
22 reasonable. So my valuation was not based on the model
23 outputs.

24 Q. Well, can we look at your methodology report, please,
25 which is Appendix 3 to your report, which is at tab 2.

1 MR. THOMAS: And if we could pull that up, please?

2 And if we could pull up paragraph 1, please?

3 A. Sorry, what page are we on?

4 Q. This is Appendix 3 -- it's the methodology section of your
5 expert report.

6 A. Right. So where -- oh, okay. Sorry. Um-hum.

7 Q. And paragraph 1 says, "Due to the lack of a pricing model
8 for securities with coupon rates set by an auction process, and
9 uncertainty of expected future cash flows, based on the
10 willingness and ability of Giants to fully redeem the
11 securities at face value or extend the securities each period,
12 I constructed a model to value the securities with the
13 assistance of my staff, working at my direction."

14 And did you do that? Did you construct a model?

15 A. Like I said, with the assistance of my staff, yes.

16 Q. Okay. This is a model that was created just for the
17 purposes of valuing these four bonds?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Now, in your prior positions --

20 A. For testing -- excuse me. For testing -- if I can add --
21 for testing the price valuation. Because actually, if you look
22 in the reliance materials, you'll see that the model would
23 produce a price, you know, above par, at different points in
24 time.

25 Q. So actually, the model you created would actually produce

1 a price for the security above par?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And in the middle of a frozen auction market, you believed
4 it's reasonable to value it above par?

5 A. No, I didn't -- that's why I didn't value it above par, I
6 valued it at par. But the inputs to the model, which is a
7 standard, you know, discounted cash flow analysis with a
8 default probability, you know, and an assumed coupon rate, the
9 assumed coupon rate, because of the failed -- because the fail
10 process, you know, in the auctions, and because of what rates
11 would be charged given the difficulties of the auction-rate
12 securities market at the time, you'd discount back those cash
13 flows depending on how long they're going to be outstanding.
14 And the model will tell you that the price should be above par.
15 But I didn't think that that was a reasonable assessment of
16 what this price should be.

17 Q. So you agree, your model that you developed to value this
18 product, produced an unreasonable price?

19 A. I produced a -- yeah, I think that that's -- I think it
20 produced a price that was above par, and I didn't think that
21 that was a reasonable price in the market. But you can adjust
22 different aspects of the model to -- but I didn't utilize that
23 price.

24 Q. So your actual price that you did utilize was not a
25 product of observed prices in the market or a product -- or

1 custodian price, or a product of your model, but rather, it was
2 your opinion?

3 A. Yes, it's my opinion.

4 Q. Okay. And in your provision -- your prior positions with
5 Morgan Stanley and other companies you mentioned, you had not
6 been responsible for developing models or have any role in
7 developing models for valuation of securities, correct?

8 A. That's correct.

9 Q. If we could turn to tab 26, please? And again, this is
10 our effort to try to chart some of the variables described in
11 your model. I'm not going to go through them, but I did want
12 to confirm, again, that your model has a lot of assumptions and
13 judgments that required to be made?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And one of the assumptions I do want to ask you about is
16 this coupon rate of sixteen percent that you assume. Is that
17 an important variable in your analysis?

18 A. Yes, it is.

19 Q. Okay. And is it -- how did you come up on sixteen percent
20 as the coupon rate?

21 A. I basically just thought of what a reasonable market
22 participant, you know, may be interested in bidding in this
23 auction in order to own these securities. And at that time,
24 there was significant disruptions. And because of the coupon-
25 setting mechanism, my experience with clients when I was

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1 transacting in these securities in February, March time period
2 of 2008, the rates that were being set were substantially above
3 LIBOR rates. And so there was an assumption built into that
4 level based on my prior experience and based on what the fail
5 rate was of twenty-two percent on the securities.

6 Q. Just so I understand your testimony, you're saying that in
7 calculating what you thought was a likely coupon rate as of
8 September 22nd at 12:01 a.m., you independently came up with
9 the idea that a likely rate would be sixteen percent. Is that
10 right?

11 A. Yeah. You could vary it to a great degree, and it
12 wouldn't impact the valuation very much.

13 Q. Okay. Did you -- so it's just coincidence that once they
14 actually hired Goldman Sachs and had an auction for the first
15 time since March 2008 -- they had an auction in November 2008,
16 that the rate set at the auction was sixteen percent?

17 A. I think that the rates were vary -- you know, they
18 changed. I believe they were between fifteen, sixteen,
19 et cetera. But I could use any rate below twenty-two percent
20 in order to make that calculation.

21 Q. I understand --

22 A. So the answer -- the answer to your question is, it is,
23 that didn't enter my analysis, you know, what the rate set by
24 the -- by Barclays later on.

25 Q. Okay. So you understand, though, in November there was an

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1 actual successful auction that set the rate at sixteen percent?

2 A. Yeah. I believe that that's what I remember.

3 Q. But it's your testimony that in the year prior to that,
4 between March of 2008 and November of 2008, the rates had been
5 much lower in the two to five percent range. Is that right?

6 A. Yeah, they were in the two to five percent range, you
7 know, more than likely because Lehman Brothers owned a
8 substantial amount of those securities and because they were
9 paying that side of the swap. It was my assumption that, you
10 know, a market rate like that would be something that Lehman
11 would be willing to hold the securities at, as long as it was
12 above their cost of financing.

13 Q. Okay. And it's your testimony that in coming up with the
14 coupon rate as of September 19th or September 22nd, 2008, even
15 though it had been at lower rates, that you independently came
16 up with a sixteen percent coupon rate, and it's just coincin --
17 and you did that without taking into consideration what
18 happened in November, which was an auction which happened to
19 set the coupon rate at exactly sixteen percent? Is that your
20 testimony?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Because it would be improper, from your view, from a
23 valuation standpoint, to be using data that people just learned
24 in November from events that occurred in November, in valuing a
25 security as of September 22nd. Is that right?

1 A. Yes, that's correct. I mean, I think the valuation, once
2 again, you have to consider the historical market conditions.
3 And one of the major, major, major contributors to this is that
4 Barclays now owned the security. Okay? And so Barclays had an
5 incentive to set the coupon at as high a level as they could
6 possibly set it at, as the holder of that security as opposed
7 to -- because they didn't have any relationship with the Giants
8 to speak of. They didn't have the swap in place.

9 So it was Barclays' incentive to set the rate as high as
10 they possibly could, and in doing so, they could earn a higher
11 return on that particular investment, and secondly, they could
12 put potentially pressure, if you will, on the Giants Stadium
13 LLC to redeem the securities at a rate that they didn't
14 previously want to redeem the secur -- or at a rate that they
15 weren't looking for.

16 And, you know, as I point out in my report, the Giants had
17 previously redeemed over 100 million of these securities in
18 April of 2008 after, you know, some -- after one of the
19 auctions had previously failed.

20 Q. It's your testimony you came up with the sixteen percent
21 without considering the fact that that's the exact amount that
22 was set at auction in November, right?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Could we turn back to tab 11, please? And this is, again,
25 the price chart.

1 MR. THOMAS: And if we could pull up the Giants
2 Stadium portion of this chart.

3 Q. So BoNY's valuations on these bonds in this time period,
4 one is ten for the three larger bonds and forty-three for the
5 smaller bond. Is that right?

6 A. I don't recall the CUSIP numbers off the top of my head,
7 so I don't know which is which. But, yes, that's what the
8 prices on the screen show.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. I don't know which is large and which is smaller.

11 Q. Okay. And the -- do you know which one has the higher
12 credit rating?

13 A. Pardon me?

14 Q. Do you know which bond up here has the highest credit
15 rating, or are they the same?

16 A. I think they're the same.

17 Q. You think all four bonds have the same credit rating?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Was that an important consideration for your opinion?

20 A. The fact that the BW3 rating was in place was an important
21 consideration, yes.

22 Q. And but you end up rejecting the BoNY valuations, correct?

23 A. Yes, I did.

24 Q. Okay. And in fact, you didn't even consider the BoNY
25 marks at all, right?

1 A. Pardon?

2 Q. You didn't even consider the BoNY marks at all, right?

3 A. No, I did not.

4 Q. Okay. So is it your opinion that it's reasonable, in
5 doing a valuation, to reject the value of a custodial bank to
6 reach -- strike that.

7 Is it your opinion that it's reasonable to reject the
8 value that a custodial bank places on a security in doing a
9 valuation?

10 A. I'm not -- I'm not opining on the value of custodial
11 marks. But what I did -- what I have opined on is that I
12 looked at these marks and I looked at the security and I looked
13 at Professor Pfleiderer's report, and I thought that these
14 prices were, you know -- were unreasonable. And so I disagree
15 with their prices. But I don't disagree with the overall
16 methodology of custodial marks.

17 Q. Okay. Now, in this case, BoNY was more than a custodian
18 bank, right?

19 A. I don't know what you mean by that.

20 Q. Do you know what role BoNY played with respect to these
21 Giants Stadium bonds?

22 A. I believe that they were what was termed the auction
23 agent.

24 Q. Okay. Any other role?

25 A. I don't recall.

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1 Q. Did you analyze what role they may have involved (sic) in
2 these particular bonds?

3 A. No. I analyzed the role -- you know, I analyzed what the
4 market participant would look at.

5 Q. Were you aware that they were the trustee on the bonds?

6 A. I don't believe that I was aware of that, no.

7 Q. So you didn't take that into consideration in rejecting
8 BoNY's marks?

9 A. No, I did not.

10 Q. Now, the first time you began to do any work in the
11 auction-rate securities market, was in early 2008. Is that
12 right?

13 A. That's correct, yes.

14 Q. And that was at Morgan Stanley?

15 A. Yes, that's correct.

16 Q. And the involvement with valuations of auction-rate
17 securities would have been along the lines we discussed earlier
18 in discussing marks with traders and clients. Is that correct?

19 A. No. Mine was much more hands-on. It was, as I mentioned,
20 after the market had -- after the market had undergone its
21 disruptions, I had some clients that were interested in
22 entering the market. And so frankly, we would -- we did
23 exactly what I did in this matter, which is, that we would look
24 at what the different auctions were that Morgan Stanley was
25 conducting on any given day, and we would look at what the fail

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1 rates were on those particular auctions. We would look at the
2 credit rating and understand the credit characteristics of the
3 companies that were auctioning on that particular day. And
4 then in consultation with my clients, what we would do is
5 submit bids in the auction process in order to -- for my
6 clients to buy the securities, which we did.

7 Q. Okay. After you began your first work ever in early
8 September 2008, and then after -- in auction-rate securities --
9 and then after the spring of 2008, you only spent ten percent
10 of your time valuing any securities at all, right?

11 A. Yes. I believe that that's the testimony that I gave at
12 my deposition.

13 Q. And was that true and accurate?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And after the spring of 2008, any time you spent valuing
16 auction rate securities would have been less than five percent
17 of the time, right?

18 A. I don't know how you come up with that figure. But I
19 spent a -- you know, not a large percentage of my time doing
20 transactions in auction-rate securities, no.

21 Q. Well, if you could please turn to tab 1 of your binder,
22 your deposition, page 21, lines 13 to 16? And actually it
23 starts up above it, line 17:

24 "Q. And after the spring, did you devote any time to valuing
25 auction-rate securities while you were at Morgan Stanley?"

1 "A. Yes.

2 "Q. What percentage of your time would that have been?

3 "A. Less than five percent."

4 Q. Do you recall that testimony?

5 A. I don't recall that, but you know, I think that, as I
6 mentioned before, that's probably an accurate statement.

7 Q. Okay. So you started in early 2008. And then after
8 spring of 2008, it's less than five percent, correct?

9 A. Yeah, because when I was involved in this market, it was
10 right -- you know, in a time period that was very similar to
11 the -- you know, it was after this market was in disruption and
12 it was in a period where investors, you know, were looking to
13 take advantage of potentially high rates of -- high rates that
14 they could achieve and high returns for highly rated
15 securities. So it wasn't a substantial amount of my time that
16 was spent on this.

17 Q. And then you left Morgan Stanley in July of 2008. Is that
18 correct?

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. And that's why you say you were not in the market as of
21 September 2008, right?

22 A. That's correct.

23 Q. And after leaving Morgan Stanley, you formed Chilton
24 Partners in September 2008?

25 A. Yes. It was -- yes.

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1 Q. And Chilton Partners doesn't really have any partners.
2 You're the sole employee, correct?

3 A. That's correct.

4 Q. Okay. And Chilton Partners was primarily focused on
5 litigation support?

6 A. Chilton Partners is just my company that I just utilize in
7 order to -- in order to do this type of expert witness and
8 litigation consulting work. But a hundred percent of my
9 engagements up to now have been through Navigant.

10 Q. And Chilton Partners was primarily focused on litigation
11 support, correct?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And you spent less than ten percent of your time with
14 Chilton valuing any type of securities, right?

15 A. That's -- I -- one of the different roles that I do is in
16 valuation, you know, of securities. So the different matters
17 that I've been involved in, some of them are valuation, some of
18 them are not valuation.

19 Q. Okay. It would be less than ten percent of your time,
20 right? That's what you testified at your deposition?

21 A. That's probably correct.

22 Q. Okay. And in March of 2008, you were involved in the
23 marketing of auction-rate securities for Morgan Stanley?

24 A. I don't recall the specific dates. But that would be
25 after February, so March sounds about right.

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1 Q. Okay. And if we could turn to tab 21, please? And this
2 is a Market Watch article about Morgan Stanley being sued over
3 auction-rate securities marketing. Were you aware of that
4 litigation?

5 A. I was -- at my deposition it was brought up, and I believe
6 that that's the first time I knew about this.

7 Q. That's the first time you knew, at your deposition?

8 A. I believe so, yes.

9 Q. And would you also look at tab 30, please? And this is a
10 release by the New York Attorney General's Office. Were you
11 aware of the State Attorney General investigations of the same
12 matter with respect to --

13 A. I was not aware of those, no.

14 Q. Did you ever become aware of them?

15 A. At my deposition testimony, I believe they -- I was asked
16 this question.

17 Q. Are you aware, as you sit here today, that these lawsuits
18 and investigations involve the failure to account for the
19 illiquidity of auction-rate securities?

20 A. I'm sorry?

21 Q. Are you aware, as you sit here today, that this lawsuit
22 and the Attorney General investigations revolved around the
23 failure by Morgan Stanley and others to account for the
24 illiquidity of auction-rate securities?

25 A. I'm not aware of that. I haven't read the re -- I haven't

1 read the -- I have not read the claim or the settlement
2 document.

3 Q. Okay. In your valuation of the Giants bonds, you don't
4 make a liquidity adjustment, correct?

5 A. That's correct, because of the mechanism -- because of the
6 mechanism by which I believe that these securities are traded
7 in the marketplace or change hands in the marketplace, through
8 the auction process.

9 Q. Okay. Now, at tab 3, which is your declaration, paragraph
10 20 --

11 MR. THOMAS: If we could pull up the first part of
12 that, there?

13 Q. -- you say, "As a" --

14 A. One second, please.

15 Q. Sorry.

16 A. Okay. Thank you.

17 Q. You say, "As a former market participant, my conclusion as
18 to the valuation of the Giants Stadium's bonds wasn't as
19 reliable." But you were not a market participant as of
20 September 2008, correct?

21 A. No, I was basing it on my experience over twenty years in
22 the markets.

23 Q. Right. But with auction-rate securities, it was several
24 months?

25 A. I think that it's very -- very, very, very important to

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1 consider that the market changed rather dramatically as far as
2 these securities are concerned. And when I entered the market
3 and started to become involved in the auction-rate securities,
4 it was in a time period, you know, when -- which is much more
5 relevant to the time period that we're talking about here. And
6 you're also looking at a client or a holder of these securities
7 in Barclays that had similar incentives to the types of clients
8 that I was trading auction-rate securities with as well.

9 Q. If we could turn --

10 A. I don't think it's a question of time, I think it's a
11 question of, you know, related experience.

12 Q. -- if we could turn to tab 29, please?

13 A. 29?

14 Q. Yes, please. Are you familiar with municipal securities
15 rule-making boards?

16 A. Not re -- generally. But that's all.

17 Q. You don't know what it is?

18 A. I generally know what it is.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. These are -- I'd point out that the Giants Stadium bonds
21 are not municipal bonds, they're corporate auction-rate
22 securities. They're not municipal auction-rate securities.

23 Q. Okay. And do you think that -- well, let me ask you to
24 turn to page 2, please.

25 MR. THOMAS: And if we could pull up the -- that part

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1 right there.

2 Q. Look at the third sentence, where it reads, "Shortly after
3 the broader financial crisis that began in the second half of
4 2007, the ARS market experienced widespread failed auctions and
5 effectively collapsed in early 2008, resulting in no new ARS
6 issuance at December 2007."

7 Do you agree with that assessment?

8 A. Yes. That's when I started getting involved in the
9 market.

10 Q. Um --

11 A. I mean, just because the market had widespread auction
12 failures, it doesn't mean that new participants would not be
13 willing to take advantage of those changes in the market.

14 Q. Did you analyze the level of activity in the market as of
15 September of 2008?

16 A. No, I did not.

17 Q. Okay. And the Giants bonds had -- one Giants bond that
18 had been put up for auction in March of 2008 failed at auction,
19 correct?

20 A. Based on the -- based on the coupon setting of twenty-two
21 percent that I observe in the Bloomberg data, my assumption is
22 that the auction failed, yes.

23 Q. Okay. And as of September 22nd, there had been no
24 successful auctions of these bonds -- any of the four bonds,
25 since March 2008, correct?

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1 A. That's the testimony of one of the other ex -- I'm
2 sorry -- of Mr. Teague. I don't have any reason to believe
3 that that was true or untrue.

4 Q. Did you consider that in your opinion, whether it was
5 true or untrue?

6 A. Did -- what's the question?

7 Q. Did you consider whether there had been any successful
8 auctions since March of 2008?

9 A. Well, all of the -- none of the auctions actually, you
10 know, had twenty-two percent as a fail rate, so there could
11 have been other things going on. But my analysis was based on
12 the market conditions, you know, overall of an environment of
13 failed auctions.

14 Q. But had there been any successful auctions of these bonds
15 in 2008 as of September 22, 2008?

16 A. I'm sorry, what's the question?

17 Q. Had there been any successful auctions of any of the
18 Giants bonds between March 2008 and September 22, 2008?

19 A. Based on some of my analysis of the coupon setting rates,
20 I think the answer to that is probably yes.

21 Q. And did you do any independent analysis of that?

22 A. No.

23 Q. Okay. And when you say your analysis of the coupon-
24 setting rates, are you referring to the fact that rates were
25 changing?

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1 A. In -- no, I looked at all the different securities, and
2 you can see that some of the securities that warrant the Lehman
3 bonds that were issued by the Giants, those rates were set, you
4 know, at eight-plus percent or so.

5 Q. So --

6 A. So that would indicate to me that there were -- those were
7 auctions, you know, that were set.

8 Q. And did you consider whether there was a provision in the
9 agreement that would allow for different rate setting other
10 than through auctions?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Okay. And is there?

13 A. Yeah, there is what they call an all-hold rate.

14 Q. Okay. And --

15 A. And also the rate, as I mentioned earlier, that if there
16 wasn't an auction taking place, then it would reset at 110
17 percent of LIBOR.

18 Q. Okay. And did you do an analysis to see whether the rates
19 you were observing were, in fact, consistent with that
20 alternative rate setting?

21 A. No, I did not.

22 Q. And --

23 A. I looked at -- you know, subsequent to -- subsequent, I
24 looked at what the rates that were set -- that were set between
25 the failure -- the bankruptcy filing until this setting -- I'm

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1 sorry, until the appointment of Goldman Sachs. And I analyzed
2 the fact that all of those rates were 110 percent of LIBOR for
3 the four securities that I analyzed.

4 Q. Can you state where there has been any -- was there any
5 successful auction of the Giants bonds between March 2008 and
6 November 2008?

7 A. I'm sorry, what's the question?

8 Q. Can you state whether there were any successful auctions
9 of the Giants bonds between March 2008 and November 2008?

10 A. Not with any degree of certainty, no.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. I had to assume it based on what I saw the coupon rates --

13 Q. So part of your conclusion is based on the assumption that
14 there were successful auctions during that period of time,
15 correct?

16 A. No, not at all. I mean, my valuation is based on there's
17 a new holder of the securities. The new holder of the
18 securities has the opportunity to either put their securities
19 up for renewal or redemption. And if they put their securities
20 up for redemption and they don't get redeemed and nobody bids
21 in the auction, then you reset the coupon at the fail rate. If
22 you are the holder of the security, you can set the rate that
23 you want to set.

24 And my testimony is that the Giants, in my opin -- I'm
25 sorry -- that Barclays, in my opinion, were incentivized to set

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1 the rate as high as they possibly could. So whether or not
2 there was a failed auction or not previously, you know, to me,
3 gave indication of what's the potential coupon rate that could
4 be set.

5 Q. So you said you assumed -- your word -- you assumed that
6 there were successful auctions, but that was irrelevant to your
7 evaluation?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And you ended up valuing the bonds at par, right?

10 A. That's correct, a hundred percent of face.

11 Q. And you're aware of Mr. Schwaba, in his report, stated
12 that failed ARS would trade below par and may be subject to
13 restrictive liquidity? Are you aware that's what's stated in
14 his report?

15 A. I'm aware that he stated that in his report. And I'm also
16 aware that you need to, as I said in my deposition testimony
17 and I believe in my declaration as well, that you have to look
18 at the specifics of each particular security. And, you know,
19 the particulars of this security had a fixed-rate fail rate.
20 And the generalization of the auction-rate securities market,
21 you know, does not necessarily have those same characteristics.

22 So what I did was a robust analysis of this particular
23 security in order to say whether or not the rate -- you know,
24 what the fail rate would have been.

25 Q. Did you -- were you aware, before you gave your opinion,

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1 that Mr. Schwaba's opinion included the statement that, "failed
2 ARS would trade below par and may be subject to restricted
3 liquidity"?

4 A. I didn't read his report prior to doing my report.

5 Q. You became aware of that later, right?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And did you raise with movants that that's a problem for
8 your report?

9 A. Pardon me?

10 Q. Did you raise with movants that that's inconsistent with
11 your analysis?

12 A. No, I didn't.

13 Q. If you would turn to tab 30, please? And this is back to
14 the Attorney General release. And if we could look at the
15 third paragraph. The second sentence in there, starting with
16 "Firms" says, "Firms will also pay damages to investors who
17 sold securities for a loss." Do you understand selling
18 securities for a loss -- the auction-rate securities for a loss
19 means they're selling below par?

20 A. I'm sorry?

21 Q. Do you understand that when someone sells an auction-rate
22 security for a loss they're selling it below par?

23 A. It could be they bought it above par, they could sell it
24 at a different price, and that would be below -- that would be
25 a loss.

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1 Q. Did you do any analysis of the losses incurred by holders
2 of auction-rate securities during 2008?

3 A. No.

4 Q. And do you believe that the rating for an investment grade
5 bond, whether it is Aaa or Baaa impacts the value of the bond?

6 A. Yes, I do.

7 Q. A higher rated bond results in a higher value of the bond?

8 A. Not necessarily. It all depends on the coupon rate, you
9 know, and what the price is -- I mean, what the coupon rate is
10 on the bond and what the characteristics are on the bond -- I
11 mean, what the value would be to that bond. So it's not
12 necessarily, you know, that just the higher credit rating, you
13 know, means that it's a higher value.

14 Q. Is it an important consideration what the credit rating
15 is, in your view?

16 A. In what?

17 Q. In coming up with a valuation for a bond?

18 A. Yes, it is.

19 Q. Okay. In 2007, Moody's ratings on these bonds was Aaa,
20 right?

21 A. Yes, that's -- as I mentioned before, that the original
22 ratings on the bonds were based on -- were based on the
23 monoline wrap rating of Aaa. And, you know, as you can see --
24 as you can see from the Moody's report, which is included in
25 these -- in the documents that you provided to me, you'll see

1 they very clearly state -- it's behind tab 10 -- they very
2 clearly state in the second paragraph that Moody's assigned a
3 Aaa rating in August and that Moody's -- and I'll quote here,
4 "Moody's ratings on securities that are guaranteed or 'wrapped'
5 by a financial guarantor are generally maintained at a level
6 equal to the higher of: a) the rating of the guarantor," which
7 in this case was FGIC, and it was B1; "or b) the published
8 underlying rating. Accordingly, the Company has requested that
9 Moody's publish an underlying rating of its senior debt
10 securities. And the investment grade underlying rating
11 reflects the credit considerations, including the following."

12 So that's -- that's why the bonds were rated Baa3 at that
13 point in time, because the wrapper previously was downgraded,
14 and the rating of these particular securities was now rated at
15 the underlying rating of the company.

16 Q. Well, in fact, the -- well, let's go ahead and turn to tab
17 13. It might be easier to discuss this with the chart. In
18 fact, the bonds themselves had been rated Aaa in 2007, correct?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Okay. And what you're saying is that Moody's would rate
21 it based upon generally the higher of the bonds or the wrapper
22 or fin -- which is also the financial guarantor or insurer of
23 the bonds, correct?

24 A. That's correct.

25 Q. And the reason why the financial guarantor was relevant is

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1 because if the bonds failed, an investor in the bond would look
2 to the financial guarantor, the insurer, or as you call it, the
3 wrapper, to recover, right?

4 A. That's my understanding, yes.

5 Q. Okay. And at this -- on this chart we're looking at, it
6 shows that the ratings on the bonds themselves were Aaa in
7 2007, but had sunk to Baa3, right?

8 A. That's correct.

9 Q. Okay. And --

10 A. Because of the downgrade of FGIC -- F-G-I-C.

11 Q. Okay. Well, that's -- the downgrading of -- that's not
12 accurate, is it? Why they pointed that out was because Giants
13 had asked Moody's, in fact, to go ahead and publish the rating
14 based upon the underlying bonds, given the junk status of the
15 financial guarantor, correct?

16 A. That's what the release says, yes.

17 Q. Okay. And if you would turn, please, to tab 25 -- and
18 we'll come back to this chart -- but turning to tab 25 briefly,
19 it's Moody's rating symbols and definitions. And page 10 --

20 MR. THOMAS: The bottom of page 10, if we could just
21 pull that chart up?

22 Q. So the Baa3 rating that was on the bonds as of September
23 2008, was the very lowest investment grade rating there was,
24 correct?

25 A. That's correct.

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1 Q. So they had previously been at Aaa, and by September 2008,
2 they were down to Baa3, correct?

3 A. That's correct.

4 Q. Okay. Now, you mentioned the wrapper -- the insurer. If
5 we go back to tab 13, the insurer, FGIC, for these four bonds,
6 in fact, was Aa2 rated in 2007, correct?

7 A. I don't -- I don't know that for a fact, but it's -- yeah,
8 that's probably correct. I think that might be in the Moody's
9 report.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. I'm not sure exactly what the monoline rating was at that
12 time.

13 Q. And did you consider what the credit rating was of the
14 insurer or the financial guarantor?

15 A. No.

16 Q. Okay. The --

17 A. Because it was irrelevant. I mean, we're not -- the date
18 that I was looking at these -- valuing these securities was as
19 of the close of business on the 19th. And at that point in
20 time, the rating of the securities was Baa3. And so my
21 assessment of the credit rating of the Giants, which is
22 basically the ability for the Giants to pay a high coupon or
23 potentially redeem the bonds, was based on the investment grade
24 status of this company, the Giants Stadium LLC. It did not
25 have anything to do with the monoline wrapper rating.

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1 Q. And you didn't consider the monoline wrapper rating?

2 A. No, I did not.

3 Q. But the monoline wrapper rating, the financial guarantor
4 of the bonds, by September of 2008, had fallen all the way from
5 Aa2 down into junk status, correct?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Okay. And if after the sale to Barclays, a different
8 company with a higher credit rating became the wrapper of the
9 bonds, that would impact your analysis, right?

10 A. It potentially could.

11 Q. Okay. And that's, in fact, exactly what happened, right?
12 In November of 2008, Goldman Sachs stepped in and became the
13 marketing agent, and FCA was appointed the financial guarantor,
14 and FCA had A rated creditworthiness?

15 A. I'm sorry, what's the question?

16 Q. Isn't that what happened?

17 A. The underlying rating of the Giants bonds was Baa3 all the
18 way, you know, until now.

19 Q. You understand, I'm asking about the financial guarantor.
20 At September 2008, the financial guarantor of this bonds was
21 junk status, and then in November the financial guarantor
22 changed to an Aa-rated company in connection with Goldman Sachs
23 becoming the marketing agent? Is that right?

24 A. I was not aware of that.

25 Q. So you didn't take that into consideration?

1 A. No. I took into consideration the underlying rating of
2 the bonds itself.

3 Q. Okay. Do you understand that Barclays heavily considered
4 the upgrade of the financial guarantor in its decision to write
5 up, as you say, the value of these bonds at later points in
6 time?

7 A. I'm sorry, what's the question?

8 Q. Do you understand that Barclays considered heavily the
9 fact that a new financial guarantor with a Aaa rating had taken
10 over these bonds in deciding to later write up the value of
11 these bonds?

12 A. I'm not aware that that's the case, because the bonds were
13 actually ra -- the bonds themselves were rated Baa3, which is
14 exactly what, you know, what they were rated on the date that I
15 valued them. And that's the value -- based on what I -- the
16 publicly available information on these bonds. Right? These
17 bonds still had a rating of Baa3 and it never changed.

18 Q. So you think going from a financial guarantor with junk
19 bond status to a financial guarantor of Aaa credit rating,
20 doesn't affect the valuation of the bonds?

21 A. Yes, because the valuation of the bonds is based on the
22 coupon as well as the creditworthiness of the bonds. And you
23 have to take that into consideration, which I did take into
24 consideration, the coupon-setting mechanism, the underlying
25 credit characteristics of a Baa3 assurer. Right. And that was

1 all taken into consideration, you know, by me.

2 Q. If you would turn to tab --

3 A. I didn't see any documentation of the change of a -- you
4 know, change of the monoline wrapper.

5 Q. -- if you would turn to tab 9, please?

6 A. This is an e-mail discussion of the Giants bond and how
7 and why Barclays valued it the way it did at later points in
8 time. Did you review this document?

9 A. Yes, I did.

10 Q. Does it mention the issue of how the bonds were wrapped?

11 A. Yes, it does.

12 Q. Okay. And if these developments occurred in November of
13 2008, would it be -- you're not saying that Barclays should
14 have factors these developments into its September 22nd
15 valuation, are you?

16 A. I'm sorry, I don't understand the question.

17 Q. If these developments --

18 A. What developments are we referring to?

19 Q. -- the replacement of a junk financial guarantor with a
20 Aaa financial guarantor and the joining of Goldman Sachs as the
21 marketing agent. You're not suggesting that Barclays should
22 have taken those things into consideration in a September 22nd
23 valuation of these bonds, are you?

24 A. No. I mean, if -- I haven't seen any public information
25 that says that the financial guarantor was changed. All I saw

1 was the rating of the securities was the same throughout.

2 Q. So you haven't analyzed whether the financial guarantor's
3 ratings were changed?

4 A. No. I analyzed the bonds themselves. And the bonds
5 themselves had that same rating.

6 Q. Okay. I mean, it's an easy thing to do to see the rating
7 of the financial guarantor, FCA, correct?

8 A. But it's also an easy thing to do looking at the bonds
9 themselves. And that's what I was valuing.

10 Q. My questioning was just regarding the financial guarantor.
11 Did you -- it's easy to look up on Moody's as to what the
12 financial rating is for FCA --

13 A. Right.

14 Q. -- when they became financial guarantor, right?

15 A. It wasn't -- as I said, I'm not aware that they became the
16 financial guarantor.

17 Q. Okay. You did not investigate or consider whether or not
18 Lehman had difficulty selling its positions in the Giants
19 Stadium's bonds, leading up to the Barclays transaction,
20 correct?

21 A. No, I did not.

22 Q. Okay. You did not investigate or consider whether or not
23 there was an auction agent in place as of September 22nd,
24 correct?

25 A. No, I did not. But subsequent to my deposition I, you

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1 know, reviewed the documentation -- reviewed the documentation
2 to understand exactly what would happen in the event of no
3 auction -- what the coupon-setting mechanism would be.

4 Q. You didn't consider the auction-rate history prior to
5 February 2008, did you?

6 A. Yes, I did. I considered it from the perspective of
7 looking at the failed auction, you know, on some of the other
8 securities. But yes, I looked at that.

9 Q. Is that subsequent to your deposition?

10 A. I believe I -- you know, I looked at it beforehand --
11 before the deposition.

12 Q. Well, do you recall -- okay, could you please turn to page
13 117 of your deposition? And at lines 6 to 14 you were asked:

14 "Q. Did you consider the auction-rate history prior to
15 February of 2008 to be irrelevant for your conducton?

16 "A. No, I didn't consider it to be irrelevant, I just didn't
17 consider it. I didn't consider it in this paragraph."

18 Q. Are you saying you considered it somewhere else or --

19 A. No, I -- what you're -- maybe I didn't understand your
20 full question before. But this says "before February 2008".

21 Q. Right.

22 A. I'm not sure whether or not you said that before or not.

23 Q. That was the question. Did you consider the auction-rate
24 history prior to February 2008?

25 A. No, I didn't. Sorry.

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1 Q. Do you know whether there were any actual sales conducted
2 at any of the rates you listed in your report?

3 A. Excuse me?

4 Q. You list a number of rates in your report, correct? Do
5 you know if there were any sales actually conducted at those
6 rates?

7 A. You -- because these -- you don't know whether or not the
8 bonds actually changed hands, right, at those particular rates,
9 because as we talked about before, if a holder of the
10 securities wants to hold a security from one auction to the
11 next, then there's no changing hands. So you only know what
12 the rate is of those securities.

13 Q. Were you aware that the Giants themselves attempted to get
14 the -- get major market players to provide a value on their
15 swap agreement with Lehman relating to the Giants bonds, and
16 that B of A, JPMorgan and Goldman Sachs all declined, in part,
17 because of conditions in the ARS market?

18 A. No, I didn't consider that.

19 Q. Would you take a brief look at tab 8, please? And it's
20 going to be page -- this is a filing with the bankruptcy court.
21 And it's excerpts of a filing, because it's couple hundred
22 pages, I believe. But I wanted to ask you to briefly look at
23 what I have as page 88 of the PDF. And it's --

24 A. Page 88.

25 Q. -- and it's under a section entitled "Inability to use

1 market quotations to determine settlement amount." And it's
2 relating, I believe, to the valuation of the swap transaction,
3 not the bonds per se. But there's comments in the third
4 paragraph that I want to look at.

5 It says, "The defaulting party has contracted three
6 leading dealers in New York: Bank of America, JPMorgan and
7 Goldman Sachs, that meeting the ratings requirements providing
8 market quotations in Section 6 of the confirmation issued under
9 the agreement. All three dealers have informed us that they
10 are unwilling to provide a quotation pursuant to Section 6 and
11 do not believe that it would be practicable to do so. The
12 primary reasons that were cited by the dealers were", and
13 there's a list of five.

14 The second one is "the absence of liquidity and
15 unpredictability of pricing in the market for auction rate
16 securities".

17 The first question is just, do you agree with that
18 assessment of the marketplace as of this time?

19 A. The absence of liquidity and unpredictability of pricing
20 of auction-rate securities market. Of the overall auction-rate
21 securities market, yes. I do agree with that statement.

22 Q. Okay. And the next reason they cite is the downgrade of
23 and other developments at FGIC. FGIC was the wrapper of the
24 Giants bonds as of September 2008 until they were replaced in
25 November 2008, correct?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Okay. And it goes on to say "The uncertainty about the
3 creditworthiness of any traditional bond issuer in the long
4 term." Do you agree that the creditworthiness of a traditional
5 bond issuer is an important factor in valuing these bonds?

6 A. No. As I said, I didn't consider that. I only looked at
7 the creditworthiness of the Giants, because that's the only
8 thing that was known and knowable on September 19th.

9 Q. Now, do you know if the corporate bonds that you value --

10 MR. THOMAS: Strike that.

11 Q. Do you know generally, if corporate bonds were being less
12 frequently traded on September 19th than on other dates in
13 2008?

14 A. I don't know that.

15 Q. You didn't look at that?

16 A. No, I didn't.

17 Q. Do you know if bid-offer spreads on corporate bonds were
18 becoming narrower or broader in September 2008?

19 A. I don't know.

20 Q. Now, you don't have an opinion on what a willing buyer
21 would have paid for these four Giants Stadium bonds as of 12:01
22 a.m. on September 22, 2008, do you?

23 A. No, I don't have an opinion on what, you know, a willing
24 buyer would pay on that date. I have an opinion on what the
25 value is of these securities as of that time period, but not

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1 what a willing buyer, you know, and frankly willing seller, you
2 know, would pay on that particular date.

3 Q. Okay. So --

4 A. And time.

5 Q. -- when you say -- you're not trying to calculate fair-
6 market value of these securities, you're rather calculating
7 what you think is the intrinsic value of the security?

8 A. Yeah, I'm basing it on the -- I'm basing my value on a
9 not -- on an orderly liquidation of the securities, you know,
10 over a period of time, not I'm basing my valuation on, you
11 know, what a single market participant would pay on the last --
12 you know, at that time.

13 Q. You're not basing your valuation on what any market
14 participant would pay for these bonds, right?

15 A. I'm sorry?

16 Q. You're not valuating these bonds based upon what any
17 market participant would pay, right?

18 A. Yes, I am. I'm basing it -- I think a market participant
19 would be willing to pay, you know, what these bonds are worth,
20 which, in my opinion, for the holder of these securities, for a
21 creditworthiness of Baa3 and the ability to set a coupon as
22 high as twenty-two percent, you know, for a security that you
23 can own, that's investment grade, that's what I based my
24 opinion on.

25 Q. Well, I thought we had established, and maybe you're

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1 changing this -- I thought we had established that you did not
2 have an opinion on what a willing buyer would have paid for
3 these four Giants Stadiums bonds as of 12:01 a.m. on September
4 22nd. Is that right?

5 A. Yes, that's what I said in my deposition, yeah. I don't
6 know what a willing buyer would have paid on that -- I don't
7 know who the -- you know, I don't know what a willing buyer
8 would have paid on that date. I was analyzing the overall
9 value of the securities.

10 Q. And if you were asked to make that valuation, what a
11 willing buyer would pay for these securities as of 12:01 a.m.
12 on September 22nd, you might change your methodology, right?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And if you were asked to do that, you would have to apply
15 a liquidity discount, correct?

16 A. I think you'd have to look at the liquidity conditions in
17 the marketplace and make a determination of liquidity
18 characteristics of the security at that point in time, yes.

19 Q. And then apply a liquidity discount, correct?

20 A. Well, I think that's what I said. In the context of that.

21 Q. Okay. But you didn't do any of that?

22 A. No. Because I wasn't looking at a liquidation valuation;
23 I was looking at the value of the securities in an orderly
24 liquidation, which is what Professor Pfleiderer talked about.

25 Q. And when you say a liquidation valuation, you mean what a

1 willing buyer would pay for the securities if they were sold?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. In your evaluation, you did not attempt to take into
4 consideration the size of Barclays' position and what effect
5 that would have on how much Barclays could actually sell the
6 positions for. Is that right?

7 A. That's correct. Because I was -- you know, my
8 understanding -- the way that I, over the course of my career,
9 valued securities, was not based on the entire position, it was
10 based on what a transaction would take place at, you know,
11 whether it would be for five million or fifty million of that
12 particular bond, which is consistent with what most market
13 participants would consider.

14 Q. Now, you say in your report that Barclays should have been
15 aware of Giants' willingness to redeem the bonds. And as
16 support for that, you cite some other redemptions that were
17 done by Giants. Is that right?

18 A. That's correct. In April -- in April of 2008. And then I
19 also indicate that they did redeem the securities, you know,
20 after the valuation date.

21 Q. Okay. So --

22 A. But they did redeem the securities in April -- I believe
23 it was April 15, 2008, which is significantly before. So I did
24 take that into consideration, yes.

25 Q. Okay. So there's three redemptions you're talking about.

1 You're talking about April 15, 2008 and you're talking about
2 April and May of 2009 redemptions, correct?

3 A. That's right.

4 Q. Okay. And of the April 15th redemption, did you consider
5 whether market condition affecting those bonds were different
6 in April of 2008 than they were in September 2008?

7 A. No. I considered the willingness and ability of the
8 Giants to redeem the bonds on that particular date, not the
9 market conditions. It's a --

10 Q. Okay. And the bond that was redeemed, do you know which
11 one that was?

12 A. I do not.

13 Q. You're not aware of the fact that the one that was
14 redeemed was the one that retained a higher credit risk and was
15 valued higher by BoNY?

16 A. No, I did -- I would -- I did not. And, you know, because
17 basically you're talking about the financial wherewithal of the
18 Giants, you know. And it's not one particular -- it was a bond
19 within the 650 million dollar financing. Or I don't know if
20 it's one particular security, but it's 100 million or so of
21 that financing. And what the -- you know, what the Giants are
22 going to do -- what the rating is of that particular bond is
23 not relevant to the fact that the Giants actually redeemed the
24 securities. It's what you're -- what you're looking at there
25 is their financial ability and willingness to redeem the

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1 securities.

2 Q. Now, you recall BoNY had -- BoNY and Barclays valued three
3 of the bonds at ten and the other one at forty-three. Did you
4 assess whether the bond that was valued higher had a different
5 credit rating than the other three bonds?

6 A. No.

7 Q. So it would be a surprise to you if that bond that was
8 valued higher actually had a higher rating than the Baa3?

9 A. It would -- I mean, yeah, it would be a surprise to me.
10 But I also think that, you know my valuation was based on a
11 Baa3 rating.

12 MR. THOMAS: Your Honor, I probably have about fifteen
13 minutes, but this would be an appropriate time for a lunch
14 break, if Your Honor would like.

15 THE COURT: Let me inquire as to the extent of the
16 redirect, if any?

17 MR. TAMBE: I think it will be very short; five
18 minutes at most.

19 THE COURT: Is there a witness for this afternoon?

20 MR. SCHILLER: No, Your Honor.

21 THE COURT: What I'd be inclined to do is to just
22 complete the witness, if we can complete the witness in the
23 next twenty minutes. If you think it's going to be longer than
24 that or if your estimate is off, we can take a break.

25 It's just that we end up extending an hour and a half

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1 of the trial day for the sake of lunch. My inclination is to
2 go ahead.

3 MR. SCHILLER: Your Honor, we had an argument planned
4 for later this afternoon, but not a witness.

5 THE COURT: What do you have this afternoon?

6 MR. SCHILLER: An argument with Your Honor concerning
7 document admissions, which we discussed briefly last week
8 during a break.

9 THE COURT: I'm wondering whether or not that makes me
10 want to take lunch break now. I think it does. Let's take a
11 lunch break.

12 MR. SCHILLER: Thank you.

13 (Recess from 12:30 p.m. until 2:02 p.m.)

14 THE CLERK: All rise.

15 THE COURT: Be seated, please.

16 And please proceed with your examination.

17 RESUMED CROSS-EXAMINATION

18 BY MR. THOMAS:

19 Q. Mr. Olvany, in your report you also cite two redemptions
20 by Giants in April and May of 2009. Do you recall that?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And did you rely on those developments when reaching your
23 valuation opinions?

24 A. Not as of the date that I value the securities, but I rely
25 on that as an indication of the fact that they had previously

1 redeemed securities and that there is a likelihood that they
2 would in the future.

3 Q. Well, you did rely, in reaching your conclusions in your
4 report you did rely on the fact that those redemptions had
5 occurred in April and May of 2009, correct?

6 A. No. I relied solely on the fact that they were redeemed
7 prior to that point in time. That's just an indication that it
8 did and -- did and could happen again.

9 Q. Would you please turn to tab 1, page 151 of your
10 deposition, please? And line 24, continuing to page 152, line
11 7. Okay? And the question is:

12 "Q. Did you rely in any way in creating your valuation on the
13 fact that the Giants redeemed securities in April and May of
14 2009?

15 "A. I relied on the fact that they redeemed securities at that
16 time as a further indication that their previous bad 2:08
17 behavior could be expected to take place in the future, and
18 that's impacted in the valuation."

19 Q. Was that testimony truthful and accurate at the time?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Is it still truthful and accurate that you relied on those
22 redemptions in this way?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Now, did you consider whether market conditions had
25 improved between September, 2008 and April and May, 2009 for

1 the auction-rate securities market?

2 A. No.

3 Q. You're not suggesting that Barclays, in valuing the bonds
4 as of September 22nd, should have considered those later
5 redemptions in 2009, right?

6 A. No.

7 Q. If we could turn to tab 12, please? And this is BCI
8 Exhibit Demonstrative 1059, and we've set out here
9 circumstances as of September 22, 2008, and I just want to see
10 if you agree that these are the circumstances Barclays was
11 facing as of September 22, 2008? First, three of the four
12 Giants Stadium's bonds were downgraded to the lowest investment
13 grade rating. Do you agree with that?

14 A. Yes, I do. That's what we discussed earlier --

15 Q. And --

16 A. -- the underlying rating.

17 Q. And the insurer or financial guarantor had been downgraded
18 to junk status?

19 A. Correct.

20 Q. And the ARS markets were frozen?

21 A. That's a fair characterization of the ARS markets.

22 Q. And after the Giants bond failed at auction in 2008 there
23 were no further auctions of these bonds as of September 22,
24 2008?

25 A. I'll take Mr. Teague's testimony to that regard. I don't

1 know that to be a fact. I didn't research that on my own, as
2 we talked about earlier.

3 Q. You also agree that Barclays had no presence in the ARS
4 markets as of September 22nd.

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And do you agree that BoNY, the trustee in the bonds and
7 the custodian, had deeply discounted their value?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And you agree that there are no vendor prices available to
10 Barclays for these bonds?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. So those are the circumstances that Barclays was looking
13 at as of September 22nd, correct?

14 A. Those are the circumstances I -- while I can't speak on
15 what Barclays was thinking about completely, you know, in
16 coming to that evaluation, but those are the circumstances, you
17 know, at least these bullet points are accurate.

18 Q. If you would please turn to tab 28. Tab 28, a Wall Street
19 Journal article listing -- it's referring to companies that
20 have taken large impairment charges on their auction-rate
21 securities. And I just wanted to ask. Are you aware whether
22 companies in this time frame of 2008 were, in fact, taking
23 large impairment charges on their holding of auction-rate
24 securities?

25 A. No.

1 Q. Is that something you analyzed?

2 A. No.

3 Q. You didn't consider it one way or the other?

4 A. No.

5 Q. And if we could turn to tab 22 of your report, and
6 paragraph 26, please.

7 A. Where are we going?

8 Q. Paragraph 26 of your expert report, which should be tab 2
9 of your binder. And the first sentence says "It is plausible
10 that market conditions" --

11 A. Hold on one second. Where -- okay.

12 Q. "It is plausible that market conditions for ARS could be
13 expected to change and that other potential buyers would be
14 willing to bid for the Giants Stadium bonds."

15 Is it your opinion that Barclays, as of September 22nd,
16 should have valued these assets based on the possibility of
17 market conditions for ARS changing at some point in the future?

18 A. No.

19 Q. And we may have touched on this earlier, but do you agree
20 that reasonable market participants can come up with different
21 valuations for the same security as of the same point in time?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And both valuations could be reasonable?

24 A. It's plausible that both can be reasonable, yes.

25 Q. When you have valued securities in the past in your

1 profession have you provided ranges of values?

2 A. No. It's always been -- I've always provided a price.

3 Q. Do you recall at your deposition testimony testifying that
4 you didn't know if you had provided ranges in the past?

5 A. I don't know if that's exactly the way I said it, but when
6 we, you know, when -- when you provide a price to clients then
7 you, you know, you usually provide them a price, you know, in
8 the context of -- in the context of trading securities, in
9 which I also include valuing those securities, you know,
10 they're -- at that point in time you could discuss ranges of
11 potential prices. So I don't know the specific, you know,
12 quote, you know, in the deposition.

13 Q. Okay. So you're not sure in the past whether providing
14 prices, discussing prices, you discussed them in terms of
15 ranges?

16 A. As I said, when you're in the process of buying and
17 selling securities you could talk about, you know, the bonds
18 could trade here or they could trade there.

19 Q. Can more than one valuation methodology be used to lead to
20 reasonable valuations for corporate bonds?

21 A. Yeah, there are multiple valuation methodologies available
22 to people, yes.

23 MR. THOMAS: Thank you. I have nothing further.

24 THE COURT: Redirect?

25 REDIRECT EXAMINATION

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1 BY MR. TAMBE:

2 Q. Just a few questions, Mr. Olvany. If we could put up, if
3 you don't mind, Exhibit 1059, which is tab 12 in the Barclays
4 binder. I'm not sure we have that on our system yet. You were
5 asked questions about circumstances as of September 22, 2008.
6 Do you recall that?

7 Q. Yes.

8 A. There was a lot of other information available about these
9 Giant Stadium bonds on September 22, 2008, correct.

10 Q. Yes, and all that information I took into consideration,
11 yes.

12 MR. TAMBE: You can take that down. Thank you.

13 Q. You were asked some questions about whether following
14 September, 2008, whether there had been a change in the
15 monoline insurer for some of these bonds, some of these four
16 bonds. Do you recall those questions?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. And I believe you were asked to take a look at the
19 document that's behind tab 9 of the Barclays binder. If you
20 could just turn to that, please? I believe that's Movants'
21 Trial Exhibit 339. In that document, sir, do you see anywhere
22 any statement that says that the monoline insurer for the bonds
23 has, in fact, been changed from FGIC to some other monoline
24 insurer?

25 A. No, I didn't, and I believe I said that in my testimony

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1 earlier that I did not see any documentation anywhere about a
2 change in the monoline.

3 Q. Is it your understanding that with respect to certain
4 other of the Giants Stadium bonds there was another monoline
5 that are always been the monoline wrapper for those bonds?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And that's FSA?

8 A. That's correct. It's FSA.

9 Q. If you can turn the Barclays binder again to tab 16, which
10 is BCI Exhibit 1063, and if I could just call in the Barclays
11 folks to pull that up, because I don't think we have that in
12 our system. Do you recognize what this document is, sir?

13 A. Yes, I do.

14 Q. What is it?

15 A. This is what we refer to as the description page of a bond
16 on Bloomberg.

17 Q. I want to draw your attention to the bottom right-hand
18 corner. There's a date that appears there, 20 March, 2010. Do
19 you see that?

20 A. Yes, I see that.

21 Q. What does that date signify?

22 A. I believe that the way it works when you do a screenshot
23 on Bloomberg is that's the date that you -- that's the date
24 that you took the picture of that screen.

25 Q. And what's the rating shown for the Giants Stadium bond as

1 of that date?

2 A. Baa3.

3 Q. Okay. So unchanged from the Baa3 as of September, 2008?

4 A. That's correct.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. And, then, just for a point of clarify, on the bottom
7 you'll also notice that it says that this bond is insured by
8 FGIC, so there's -- so that is one of the bonds that you're
9 referring to.

10 Q. Changing topics, you were asked some questions about your
11 involvement while at Morgan Stanley in the auction-rate
12 securities markets. Do you recall that?

13 A. Yes, I do.

14 Q. But the clients on behalf of who you were reviewing trades
15 and recommending trades, these were people who were seeking to
16 invest in the auction-rate securities market because of the
17 turmoil in that market, correct?

18 A. Absolutely.

19 Q. They were seeing opportunities in the high max rates and
20 the fail rates in the auction-rate securities markets.

21 A. My clients took the opinion that they could participate in
22 the auction, set the rates that they would get for the auction,
23 and that if they weren't able to redeem their securities in the
24 next auction and no other market participant took place in the
25 auction, then they would receive that maximum or failed coupon

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1 rate, which they thought was also an attractive investment.

2 Q. You were asked some questions about --

3 A. Could I just add to that one?

4 Q. Sure.

5 A. A quick second. And, then, if that didn't take place, and
6 they presented their securities, once again, at the auction,
7 and another market participant did bid lower than their bid,
8 then, or lower in yield or higher in price, then they would
9 redeem their securities. So they thought that that was a good
10 opportunity.

11 Q. And when securities, auction-rate securities are redeemed
12 in that fashion in an auction, did the holder get back par?

13 A. The holder does get back par, yes.

14 Q. You were shown a couple of diagrams. One was tab 27 from
15 the Barclays binder, which is BCI Exhibit 1089. And I'm sure
16 counsel was trying to be as helpful up there as possible, but
17 does that diagram, as helpful as it is, show all of the market
18 data that you inputted into your models to arrive at prices?

19 A. No, it doesn't.

20 Q. Okay. What else did you include in your price valuations?

21 A. It doesn't -- I haven't looked at every box here, but I
22 don't believe it demonstrates the exact characteristics of the
23 bonds that you have to put into the model, whether it's a fixed
24 rate bond or floating rate bond and what the maturity is of the
25 bond, what the call provisions are of the bond. These

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1 individual characteristics of the bond, I think, are not on
2 this page anywhere.

3 Q. Yes. So in addition to all the work that's reflected
4 there you did even more work?

5 A. Absolutely.

6 MR. TAMBE: That's all the questions I have. Thank
7 you.

8 THE COURT: Is there any more?

9 MR. THOMAS: Nothing, Your Honor.

10 THE COURT: You're excused.

11 THE WITNESS: Yes.

12 MR. TAMBE: Your Honor, just one second.

13 THE COURT: But you're not excused.

14 MR. TAMBE: I don't think -- I don't believe I have
15 moved into evidence the demonstrative deck that Mr. Olvany
16 relied on when he was testifying. And I'd offer that into
17 evidence as a demonstrative and as Movants' Trial Exhibit
18 number 958.

19 THE COURT: Are we talking about this booklet?

20 MR. TAMBE: That booklet. Yes, Your Honor.

21 MR. THOMAS: Your Honor, we do have an objection. I
22 don't think all of these boards, the pages on here were
23 addressed by the witness, and there's some assertions in there
24 that we may object to, whether it be accepted as a
25 demonstrative, I guess we --

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1 THE COURT: I'm not going to accept it as evidence,
2 but I will accept it as a demonstrative which illustrates
3 aspects of his testimony and which will make it easier in
4 reviewing the record of today's testimony to understand the
5 testimony.

6 MR. TAMBE: May we offer it as a demonstrative?

7 THE COURT: It's accepted for that purpose.

8 (Deck prepared by Mr. Olvany was hereby received for
9 demonstrative purposes as Movants' Exhibit 958, as of this
10 date.)

11 MR. TAMBE: Thank you.

12 THE COURT: And you are excused now.

13 (Witness excused)

14 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.

15 MR. TAMBE: And, along the same lines, if I haven't
16 already done so, for the other demonstratives I used with the
17 other experts, again, we offer them as demonstratives to aid
18 the Court as it's reading the record.

19 THE COURT: They're all in on the same basis.

20 MR. TAMBE: Thank you, Your Honor. If I could just
21 read in the exhibit numbers. For Professor Zmijewski it's
22 exhibit --

23 THE COURT: It looks as if there's an objection, or at
24 least a comment about to be made from Barclays' counsel.

25 MR. THOMAS: Your Honor, I think we're in the same

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1 boat with some demonstratives, and we were going to just meet
2 and confer on whether there was any objection to ours, but I
3 just wanted to note that we would be moving some in also.

4 THE COURT: You'll be treated equally.

5 MR. THOMAS: Okay. Thanks.

6 MR. TAMBE: And if I could just state for the reason,
7 then, the demonstratives I'm referring to.

8 THE COURT: Fine.

9 MR. TAMBE: For Professor Zmijewski it's Movants'
10 Exhibit 910. For Mr. Garvey it's Movants' Exhibit 913. For
11 Mr. Schwaba, Movants' Exhibit 917, and for Mr. Slattery,
12 Movants' Exhibit 920, and we'd offer all of these as
13 demonstrative exhibits.

14 THE COURT: Fine. They're accepted as demonstratives
15 only.

16 (Demonstrative prepared by Professor Zmijewski was hereby
17 received for demonstrative purposes as Movants' Exhibit 910, as
18 of this date.)

19 (Demonstrative prepared by Mr. Garvey was hereby received for
20 demonstrative purposes as Movants' Exhibit 913, as of this
21 date.)

22 (Demonstrative prepared by Mr. Schwaba was hereby received for
23 demonstrative purposes as Movants' Exhibit 917, as of this
24 date.)

25 (Demonstrative prepared by Mr. Slattery was hereby received for

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1 demonstrative purposes as Movants' Exhibit 920, as of this
2 date.)

3 MR. TAMBE: Thank you, Your Honor.

4 THE COURT: Now we have some evidentiary issues to
5 address.

6 MR. SCHILLER: Jonathan Schiller for Barclays.

7 First, I wanted to hand up to the Court a stipulation,
8 an order between the trustee and Barclays concerning the 15c3
9 issues that Mr. Maguire raised with you the other day.

10 THE COURT: Does this relate to Mr. McIsaac?

11 MR. SCHILLER: No. That has to do with the exchange-
12 traded derivatives. That remains. This only has to do with
13 15c3, and it does eliminate Mr. McIsaac in that regard.

14 THE COURT: Okay.

15 MR. SCHILLER: Your Honor, I'm also going to provide
16 the Court with a stipulation to the admission of certain
17 Barclays' documents that have been agreed to between movants
18 and Barclays.

19 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

20 MR. SCHILLER: What remains for us today is to move
21 the admission of certain PwC exhibits, which we raised with
22 Your Honor eight or nine days ago and to which certain
23 objections have been made. But Mr. Hume will move their
24 admission and explain our position here.

25 MR. HUME: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

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1 THE COURT: Good afternoon.

2 MR. HUME: For the record, Hamish Hume for Barclays.

3 Your Honor, we move the admission of, I believe it's
4 twenty-five PwC work papers, and we do have a binder containing
5 those. We're happy to go through each one or simply to explain
6 generally. We believe they are all --

7 THE COURT: Am I going to take the binder now?

8 MR. HUME: Well, why don't we hand it out. I think we
9 may only have a couple of copies, but one for the Court and one
10 for movants' counsel. We've obviously identified these in
11 advance for movants' counsel, and, Your Honor, these are work
12 papers that with one or two -- there may be one exception in
13 this binder that is a Barclays's document. I'll ask my
14 colleague to identify that if that's true. But otherwise these
15 are PwC work papers prepared in the course of PwC's regular
16 business activity, and it was the regular practice of them to
17 make such work papers.

18 We would be prepared to have PwC custodian state that
19 if that's the issue. It's not clear that that is the main
20 issue. We've asked movants to state what their objections are
21 with as much specificity as possible to make this as efficient
22 as possible. We have heard back, generally, that they have an
23 objection that under Rule 701 and 702 that this is either
24 improper lay opinion or opinion of experts who have not been
25 qualified. We don't offer them as expert opinion, and there

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1 are many cases we have saying that work papers of auditors are
2 not inadmissible under 702 or 701 just because they're offered
3 to show the work of the auditors.

4 We have prepared a short letter brief. Three pages.
5 It may just spill over to the fourth page, which we'd like to
6 submit to the Court. Obviously give the estate an opportunity
7 to respond, but the case law we've seen all supports the
8 admission of these documents. We think that it would easily
9 satisfy the hearsay exception under the business records rule.

10 There has been a suggestion that there's hearsay
11 within hearsay in the documents. We would want to know exactly
12 what hearsay within hearsay movants are objecting to, and we've
13 asked and haven't yet heard specifically what it is, but much
14 of the hearsay within hearsay that we've tried to identify
15 would also satisfy the hearsay exception. For example, there
16 are references to PwC gathering pricing information from third-
17 party vendors, which would be attached to a document. That
18 comes in under, I think it's 803(17) or (16) for compilations
19 of publicly available pricing sources. Or, maybe, a reference
20 to a memo done by Barclays for how it valued a particular
21 asset, which, we would submit, would also satisfy the business
22 record exception as a record that was clearly done in the
23 regular course of business in which it was the regular practice
24 to create such a memo for the auditors.

25 So, Your Honor, I would also just point out that

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1 movants have, themselves, identified, I believe it's twenty-
2 seven PwC documents to be admitted into evidence, and twenty-
3 four of them have already been admitted, and we would stipulate
4 to the admission of the other three. They are of the same
5 kind. Some of them are e-mails. That's formal, so, perhaps,
6 slightly more debatable, but we had agreed that they were
7 admissible as business records.

8 And, if I could, I might just briefly like to show an
9 example. Let's pull up Movants' Trials Exhibit 255, which is
10 exactly the same kind of document of the kind we have in our
11 binder, a PwC memo prepared in the course of the audit, to the
12 Barclays Capital PwC Audit Team from members of that PwC
13 Structured Finance Group, one of the specialist groups that was
14 brought in to review some of the particular kinds of assets
15 acquired by Barclays in the sale and setting forth their
16 analysis in this case of price testing methodology with respect
17 to particular kinds of assets. This is exactly the kind of
18 document that we're trying to get into evidence. When they
19 identified it we agreed it's a business record. Since they
20 identified it as evidence they must believe it was admissible
21 as a business record. So there's no hearsay objection. We
22 think it would be unprincipled for them to say it's only
23 admissible when they identify it.

24 In terms of hearsay within hearsay, I would just go
25 down to the last paragraph of this letter, and it says to

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1 benchmark market prices obtained by PCG, that's the Barclays
2 group, SFG, that's a PwC group, the specialist group, obtained
3 observable trades for the municipal bonds from
4 investinginbonds.com, an online source of bond price and market
5 information. So that information, which, I believe, may be
6 attached to this memo, could be objected to as hearsay within
7 hearsay, but would fall within an independent hearsay
8 exception.

9 So, again, we didn't take objection to that, but we do
10 take objection to only having selected PwC documents admitted
11 into evidence. We believe the documents should come in, both
12 the ones they want and the ones we want. They will assist the
13 Court to see the extent and thoroughness of the PwC audit of
14 the valuations that are at issue in this case and we believe
15 are relevant and helpful to the Court.

16 There is one other example. We have another movants'
17 document. Movants' Trial Exhibit 803 is an example of an email
18 within PwC. I can see how e-mails amongst PwC auditors could
19 be more debatable as to whether they're business records, but
20 this contains -- and this contains in the e-mail a memo from
21 Sean Teague, one of the Barclays members. Now, they would say
22 that's a party admission, when it's hearsay within hearsay. We
23 would say it's a business record. But the e-mail above it from
24 PwC they must be saying is a business record, and we agreed.
25 When e-mails are written as part of the regular course of

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1 activity in an audit, and it's the regular practice to make
2 that kind of record, we have no problem accepting that as
3 admissible. There were a few they identified we objected to
4 early on in the case. We're now willing to stipulate to those.

5 Just last week Mr. Tambe, examining his expert
6 witness, Mr. Slattery, showed him a PwC document discussing the
7 valuation of Pine. I got up and recrossed Mr. Slattery on that
8 document. I forgot to move it into evidence, but that would
9 have been a good time to do so since he had just used it. But
10 that's one of the ones in our binder.

11 I think, unless the Court wishes for me to go through
12 each one, I think that's, essentially, our position. We could
13 offer up this, I hope, sufficiently concise letter brief and --

14 THE COURT: I'll obviously take a look at the letter
15 brief, which -- is that part of what's been handed to me or do
16 you have it --

17 MR. HUME: Not yet, Your Honor. It's just being
18 finalized and put on a letterhead, and I'm going to have it
19 ready in, I think, a few minutes.

20 THE COURT: Okay. I have a question. I'm going to
21 give movants' counsel an opportunity to respond on this. Just
22 so I understand what's in the binder.

23 MR. HUME: Yes.

24 THE COURT: You have argued that, in a sense, the
25 documents that are in the binder are logically within the same

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1 basket as other PwC documents that have already been admitted
2 into evidence.

3 MR. HUME: Yes.

4 THE COURT: And I'll certainly want to hear argument
5 as to why these are different. But just for my baseline
6 information, is it true that all of the PwC documents that
7 we're talking about are, for all practical purposes,
8 indistinguishable from one another, that is, they are all
9 papers generated during the course of PwC's work in auditing
10 the Barclays's portfolio?

11 MR. HUME: All of the ones -- that's my understanding.
12 You may remember I showed the ten boxes to Mr. Garvey that had
13 been produced.

14 THE COURT: It was a very vivid demonstration of
15 volume.

16 MR. HUME: And I haven't reviewed all of them, but my
17 understanding is the production of those relevant to the
18 auditing of the acquisition balance sheet, some spill that came
19 up in the midyear audit and then spilled over to the annual
20 audit. But it was only produced if it was relevant to auditing
21 the sale transaction. So in that sense they're all the same,
22 and, certainly, those that have been identified for production,
23 I think, fall within that same category. There's no separate
24 category of PwC documents that I'm aware of. I stand to be
25 corrected, but that's certainly my understanding.

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1 THE COURT: Okay. I just wanted to understand what
2 was in the binder. Basically, a selection from the huge set of
3 documents previously shown to me in court.

4 MR. HUME: Yes.

5 THE COURT: Okay.

6 MR. HUME: And I did neglect to make one last point,
7 Your Honor, that I think the movants have objected that this is
8 after our fact case is closed. First of all, we've been
9 careful not to close our fact case without making sure we get
10 our exhibits into evidence. And, second of all, the trustee's
11 lawyer did the same thing at the end of their fact case. They
12 said we're closed, except for making sure we get the exhibits
13 in, and there's ample precedent that Courts will allow exhibits
14 to come in after fact witnesses have been completed. In fact,
15 during expert testimony, as it happened today, documents can be
16 put into evidence. So we don't really understand the nature of
17 that objection.

18 THE COURT: Well, I do have a basic question. Not
19 having looked at these documents the question is simply one
20 that occurs to me as we're engaged in this debate, but it's not
21 a bottoms up question. It's a general question. Are you
22 anxious to get this information in because you believe that the
23 documents support a valuation determination made by Barclays?
24 In other words, do you view this as corroborative of the
25 judgments made by Barclays in connection with its acquisition

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1 balance sheet? And, to that extent, are you seeking to produce
2 this information as part of the record in order to strengthen
3 your argument that Barclays made fair valuation judgments with
4 respect to its acquisition balance sheet?

5 MR. HUME: Yes. We would also say they are relevant
6 to showing the thoroughness of PwC's audit, generally, and,
7 specifically, of the types of issues raised by movants'
8 experts. So we think it is relevant to support the
9 reasonableness of our valuations.

10 THE COURT: All right. I understand.

11 MR. HUME: It's relevant directly and indirectly.

12 THE COURT: Okay. So the two basic reasons that we're
13 having a discussion about this now include corroboration that
14 PricewaterhouseCoopers did a thorough job and a professional
15 job, and, also, that they did a job that verified decisions
16 made by Barclays when it prepared its acquisition balance
17 sheet. Correct?

18 MR. HUME: Correct.

19 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

20 MR. GAFFEY: Good afternoon, Your Honor. For the
21 record, Robert Gaffey from Jones Day for the debtor.

22 Just taking things slightly in reverse order, Your
23 Honor. Our principal argument is not that this is coming up
24 late in the case, except that what's really happening with this
25 offer of twenty-five some-odd PwC documents is an attempt to

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1 construct a paper expert. They are, in document after document
2 they read as if they were expert reports. PwC reviewed the
3 following hearsay, comes to the following conclusion and offers
4 an opinion that the valuation conducted by Barclays as to this
5 particular issue or that particular issue was reasonable. PwC
6 does not conduct its own valuation.

7 The hearsay within hearsay that's contained within
8 these documents is -- I take Mr. Hume's point about third-party
9 pricing materials, but, more importantly, there are statements
10 attributed and unattributed from within Barclays. Barclays own
11 statements. I can offer those in a PwC document because, as
12 Mr. Hume correctly notes, those are admissions. That's not a
13 hearsay issue. That's basic. If it's an admission we don't
14 have a hearsay question. They have a hearsay question. And
15 they have a hearsay issue because when they put in statements
16 from, unattributed statements to no particular person in
17 Barclays PCG Group, that's standard hearsay, which is
18 inadmissible.

19 The business records rule doesn't solve that problem
20 because it's second level hearsay, and under Rule 805, of
21 course, the hearsay has to be addressed at every level in the
22 chain.

23 The 701 and 702 piece, that is the opinion piece, also
24 doesn't cover this. And it doesn't cover it because although
25 Rule 803(6), that is the business records rule, allows for the

1 introduction of data and facts and opinions it doesn't allow
2 for the admission of inadmissible opinions. The point being
3 the business records rule doesn't solve a freestanding problem
4 with respect to the opinion that's offered.

5 So we look to 701 and 702. 701, of course, deals with
6 lay opinions and expressly excludes the type of scientific or
7 technical opinions that require expertise that are addressed by
8 Rule 702. So 701 doesn't get them where they want to be,
9 because this is an effort to put in this raft of
10 PricewaterhouseCoopers' documents as if PricewaterhouseCoopers
11 was an expert. Now, of course, a firm, no matter what its
12 reputation, can never be an expert. Experts are individuals.
13 They are witnesses. PwC was never put on a witness list. PwC
14 was never identified as an expert. We never had expert
15 discovery from PwC, and, it's self-evident, we've never had an
16 expert report from PwC. So when Mr. Hume says it's
17 unprincipled for us to take the position that we should resist
18 these documents, it's, actually, a very principled position.
19 It is if they had an expert and they wanted to put PwC on to
20 say we conducted a valuation, which, by the way, none of the
21 documents say, but if it said we conducted a valuation and in
22 our opinion the assets were worth x, y and z. They should have
23 qualified them. They should have called somebody from PwC, and
24 they should have put them on.

25 THE COURT: Can I break in and just ask a very basic

1 question? Did the movants take any depositions of PwC
2 employees with respect to their work?

3 MR. GAFFEY: No. Nobody did. Neither we nor Barclays
4 took depositions of the PwC witnesses.

5 THE COURT: So regardless of whether they're
6 classified as experts or lay, nobody chose to examine any of
7 the people who were involved in the audit function.

8 MR. GAFFEY: That's correct, Your Honor, but nor did
9 they ever appear on anybody's witness list. Now, as Your Honor
10 knows, we went through the 2004 discovery through the summer,
11 culminating in the filing of the claim. That was the bulk of
12 the discovery that we took, the investigatory discovery, as it
13 were. And then we had a stipulation that allowed us to take,
14 and I forgot the number, I think it was ten more depositions.
15 So we had to be careful about what we did ask for.

16 Then, when witness lists were exchanged between the
17 parties, Your Honor may recall that if a new name popped up on
18 a witness list we all agreed we would take a deposition. No
19 Pricewaterhouse witness. Today's the day that the Court's
20 being told, through paper, Pricewaterhouse is, essentially,
21 being asked to be a witness with regard to the valuation.

22 Now, it's been established. Several witness have
23 talked about, Barclays' witnesses have talked about the fact
24 that Pricewaterhouse made the pronouncement, gave the
25 conclusion, offered the opinion that the valuations conducted

1 by Barclays as to particular aspects of the securities appeared
2 reasonable. Professor Pfleiderer, who you'll hear from this
3 week, will tell you that. He'll tell you that that's, in part,
4 one of the things that he's relying on in offering the opinion
5 that they want him to be able to offer.

6 But this is an effort, actually, to fill a hole in
7 that expert case, because, as Your Honor knows from the
8 in-limine motion argument, Professor Pfleiderer did not conduct
9 a valuation. He didn't conduct a valuation of his own. And
10 even in the supplemental declaration that he put in he says --
11 he doesn't say he spoke to PwC. He says he spoke to people who
12 spoke to PwC. This is an attempt to bolster the expert case.
13 That's what's really going on here. And that's why the hearsay
14 issue and the opinion issues are important. This is not a
15 document by document litigator's fight over whether somebody
16 can keep a particular document out of evidence. Mr. Hume tells
17 you that both parties have put in some PwC documents. And he's
18 right about that. It's not about 803, which, by the way, is
19 not in evidence. But we have had stipulations. But not all
20 the time.

21 Your Honor may recall we ultimately ended a week in
22 the movants' factual phase of the case with a stipulation read
23 into the record as to what Michael Guarnuccio -- he works for
24 PwC -- would say if called to the stand. That was the result
25 of a weeklong struggle over Barclays objections about it being

1 hearsay and not authentic, to get one PwC document into
2 evidence.

3 So we've stipulated sometimes. We haven't stipulated
4 others. But we have never stipulated that PwC comes in in
5 full, which is what this is an effort to do.

6 Now, I could show you examples of the document -- if
7 we could put up, say, 607, I'll give you an example of what I'm
8 talking about, why I think these things are really ersatz
9 expert reports and not proper documents. Now, first of all, I
10 should note this is one of the documents in the binder Mr. Hume
11 handed out. The PwC production differentiates by its Bates
12 number between work papers and non work papers. This
13 particular Bates number in the lower right-hand corner does not
14 have the annotation WP, which Pricewaterhouse used when it
15 produced actual work papers. This is just a memo. Now, it
16 goes to the audit file, but it doesn't rise to the level of an
17 accountant's work paper. And let me just take my copy of that
18 out. If we could start with just scope and background, and
19 I'll show Your Honor a couple of examples of this. Just in
20 that top paragraph, Steve, scope and background, if you could
21 highlight that. This is what Pricewaterhouse says it did as
22 requested by the BarCap audit engagement team, et cetera, et
23 cetera, et cetera. PwC advisory reviewed the reasonableness of
24 the September 22, 2008 acquisition price of CDO transactions
25 for Lehman's portfolio and assessed the reasonableness of the

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1 bid-ask spread adjustment applied to the acquisition markets.

2 Now, that's what this document says is the PwC test there.

3 And let's just turn to page 2, and I'll show you where
4 that goes, and there's several examples of this in the
5 document. One, a reasonableness of using 9/30 marks as of
6 9/22/08. Now, Your Honor knows that's an issue that is at the
7 heart of the expert case here, what the appropriate date was
8 for valuing the assets that were transferred in the sale
9 transaction. And PricewaterhouseCoopers offers about halfway,
10 fourth line down, starting at the last word, based, "Based on
11 discussions we have had with market participants and
12 observations of deals that hit triggers due to the failure of
13 Lehman, any major impact", et cetera, et cetera, et cetera, and
14 it ends at the bottom. "Therefore, the September month end
15 mark should fall within a reasonable range of the acquisition
16 dates fair value, especially considering the wide bid-ask range
17 for CDOs."

18 That's an expert opinion. That's what it's being
19 offered for. It's being offered as opinion evidence. It's not
20 being offered for the truth of the matter asserted. That's the
21 reality of it. Now, to say that it should come in through
22 803(6) on a hearsay exception to offer the truth of the matter
23 asserted is a misuse of the rule. That's what's happening
24 here.

25 Now, the hearsay problem proper, within the documents,

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1 is also exemplified here. Take a look, Steve, at page 3.
2 Positions where PMGT (sic) desk price is less than PCG mark.
3 And just highlight the top paragraph. All right. There you
4 go. Starting five lines from the bottom at the end, the word
5 through. And can you highlight that through the end, please,
6 Steve?

7 "Through discussions with market participants and
8 research." Well, again, I take Mr. Hume's point about access
9 to commonly used publications in a particular industry, but
10 through discussions with market participants and research? How
11 do we cross-examine that document? How is that within the
12 limits of the business record exception, which offers something
13 for the truth? We don't know who they are. We don't know what
14 they had to say. This is the type of thing, if an expert took
15 the stand and said that, that expert could be cross-examined.
16 When Professor Pfleiderer takes the stand he will be cross-
17 examined about statements like that. Not that one, but like
18 that that he will make.

19 It's our view, Your Honor, that's in an improper use
20 of the business records exception, especially in light of 701
21 and 702, to, essentially, put in an expert report that hasn't
22 been vetted through discovery, that was never revealed before
23 the deadline, and that is where the timing of this all does
24 come into play. It's not the main part of our objection. We
25 understand that in a case that's up to, I think we're on trial

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1 date 29, we understand that there will be documents people want
2 to offer. I forgot this. I want to add these three. That's
3 going on. We're not doing that before the Court, but that goes
4 on -- I get an e-mail every morning from Mr. Green (ph.), who,
5 I think, does not sleep, with a couple of exhibits saying we
6 want to offer these or add these. That's not what this is
7 about. This is about calling PwC exhibits separate exhibits as
8 if each is just a separate hearsay problem when, in fact, it's
9 an effort to skew the record with an uncross-examinable expert.
10 And that's the reason that we're opposing this.

11 If they want to submit a letter brief I'm happy to
12 respond to it. But I don't think that the hearsay, and this is
13 just one example. I could do this with each one of the
14 documents. I'm not sure Your Honor is inclined to have me do
15 that here and now.

16 THE COURT: Well, not here and now, but if it comes to
17 it we may --

18 MR. GAFFEY: But it --

19 THE COURT: -- reserve the right to do that at some
20 point in the future.

21 MR. GAFFEY: But I think it also is telling. Your
22 Honor's questions about whether these are meant to show that
23 Pricewaterhouse conducted the work. I'm paraphrasing the
24 Court, obviously, but whether it made a judgment as to what it
25 was Barclays did, but then Your Honor asked if it also

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1 corroborated the valuation that Barclays did. Again, let's
2 look at the sequence of what the proof will be if those come
3 into the record. This is a question of fairness.

4 Mr. Tambe noted, when we argued the in limine motions
5 with regard to experts, and so far he's been right. Your Honor
6 will not see one Barclays' valuation witness take that stand.
7 You won't see Mr. Teague. You won't see Mr. Landerman (ph.).
8 You won't see Mr. Wachtell (ph.). You won't see the witnesses
9 upon whose statements Professor Pfleiderer relies. You won't
10 see PricewaterhouseCoopers. You'll just see their documents.

11 In the interest of fairness these will skew the
12 record, because they will appear to have weight. But they
13 don't. They can't have weight, because they can't be cross-
14 examined, because there never was a PwC expert. If that's the
15 expert they wanted to use they should have done it. They
16 shouldn't be allowed to use these documents to fill a hole in
17 the experts' testimony that you're going to see on Wednesday.
18 And unless Your Honor has questions, that's the shape of our
19 position.

20 THE COURT: I think this has been a useful preview of
21 what will, no doubt, be an argument we're going to have another
22 day, although it's been very effective without the benefit of
23 papers. I don't have the letter brief from Barclays. You
24 haven't had a chance to look at it and respond to it, but,
25 obviously, from your presentation, Mr. Gaffey, you're very

1 familiar with the subject and view this as a very important
2 issue in the case.

3 Because it's important I think I need the benefit of
4 the submissions of the parties in writing, including references
5 to the cases that have been alluded to by Mr. Hume in his
6 presentation as to the use of documents prepared by auditors.
7 One of the things that makes this a somewhat curious event in
8 the case at this juncture, from my perspective, is that I have
9 been very conscious of the role of PwC throughout the case, in
10 part because PwC documents have been used, but, also, because
11 in the examination and cross-examination of witnesses I have
12 been aware for some time that Barclays takes the position that
13 there is a meaningful difference between audited financial
14 results and the issues in this case and that the movants also
15 recognize a difference between audited financial results and
16 the issues in this case.

17 Nonetheless, I believe that Barclays is endeavoring,
18 and has been fairly straightforward about this, to suggest that
19 that inconsistency proved something, that you can't effectively
20 not challenge the credibility of an audit and at the same time
21 prove that the underlying valuation judgments that are included
22 in the audited numbers should be set aside in this trial. So
23 the stress, and it's been basic for weeks, if not months, is
24 that to the extent that we are involved in shadowboxing with
25 the acquisition balance sheet and its credibility, that

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1 shadowboxing is happening on both sides of the case. There's a
2 finesse going on, and what you said is true.

3 I have known about the Product Control Group since, I
4 suppose, the first day of this trial. But I haven't seen any
5 witnesses from the Product Control Group and Barclays' case has
6 closed. Do I consider that a curiosity? You bet. Do I
7 consider it a choice that they made? Obviously. But I can
8 only make judgments with respect to the record that's presented
9 to me, and I see experts on both sides, I mean the lawyers, who
10 have made strategic judgments as to what I am to see.

11 If parties chose not to examine
12 PricewaterhouseCoopers, a well respected international
13 accounting and auditing firm, but a firm whose involvement in
14 the case has been apparent at the outset, that's a choice both
15 sides made. And the fact that you didn't examine them doesn't
16 necessarily mean that you've been sandbagged here. I think
17 what it means is that judgments were made. Do you feel that
18 you were sandbagged?

19 MR. GAFFEY: That would be -- that's why I began by
20 saying we're not centering our argument on the timing, as you
21 know. I don't think I've been sandbagged. I do think it's a
22 strategic choice --

23 THE COURT: Absolutely. That's what I just said.

24 MR. GAFFEY: -- to have waited till now to say I tell
25 you what.

1 THE COURT: Both sides have made strategic choices
2 here.

3 MR. GAFFEY: Well, except, Your Honor, they put on
4 Gary Romain, their accountant, who talked about this, and we
5 were able to cross-examine him. Their choice as to how they
6 wanted to prove the accounting treatment. They put on Gary
7 Romain. We cross-examined him. We leave it to the Court to
8 decide how that one came out. But with regard to whether I
9 feel sandbagged, no. I mean, the existence of
10 PricewaterhouseCoopers is not a secret. I agree with you. But
11 what amounts to a golem of an expert is a surprise. The idea
12 that it wasn't just Pfleiderer, it was actually going to be
13 Pfleiderer and a very tall paper friend of his, were all these
14 PricewaterhouseCoopers' documents. That, I think, is the
15 essence of our problem with the manner in which his proof is
16 being put out. It's not a question of getting the custodian up
17 to say yes, it's a true copy. True and correct copy of a
18 memorandum that someone at Pricewaterhouse prepared. I don't
19 want to take the Court's time with that. That would be a mess.

20 THE COURT: And that doesn't avoid the issue, does it,
21 because this really isn't a question as to whether or not these
22 are authentic copies of authentic documents that were prepared
23 by PwC in the course of the work that they undertook at
24 Barclays request.

25 MR. GAFFEY: And that's absolutely right. And, in

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1 fact, when this issue was raised by Mr. Schiller we made
2 some -- a little bit of progress over the weekend, and one of
3 them was I withdrew our, you know, what authenticity objections
4 had been there. That would be a silly fight. They are what
5 they purport to be.

6 THE COURT: They are what they purport to be. The
7 question is whether they should come into this record.

8 MR. GAFFEY: I think it's a multiple part question,
9 Your Honor. I think it's whether they should come into the
10 record at all.

11 THE COURT: That's what I just said.

12 MR. GAFFEY: And if they do, do they come in for the
13 truth, and which part, and what weight gets accorded to them?
14 Those are the multiple parts. I think, on a straight 803(6)
15 analysis, I don't think these opinions come in. But if the
16 Court were to take them in, to allow them in, they would have
17 to, I believe, in fairness, come in only -- not for the truth
18 of the matter asserted, because they're not a fact. They're an
19 opinion. And it was their choice how to put on their
20 accounting case. They chose to put on Romain and no one else.
21 We cross-examined their accountant. We put on our experts who
22 did valuations. I won't -- you'll hear from -- the Court will
23 hear from Pfleiderer, and that issue will be joined to, and
24 we'll see who did what with respect to what's a valuation of
25 the assets here and what's not. But I don't think this is a

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1 substitute.

2 THE COURT: Well, here's what I think we should do
3 with this. I assume a letter brief, which is three and a
4 quarter pages long, single spaced, will be completed this
5 afternoon, and I'll receive it, and you'll get a copy of it,
6 and you'll have an opportunity to respond to it. And sometime
7 this week we should revisit this issue.

8 MR. GAFFEY: What I'd suggest, as a matter of timing,
9 Your Honor, is if I can -- I can get a response in by first
10 thing Thursday morning I think we'll be -- it's conceivable
11 we'll be close to done with all proof by then unless Professor
12 Pfleiderer goes even longer than I think he might on cross. We
13 still have Friday open if you need it to deal with it, and that
14 would give us a chance to address whatever cases they cite.
15 Mr. Hume says they have a lot of them. I've only seen one of
16 their cases so far. So I'd like a chance to spend tomorrow
17 researching it and finalizing --

18 THE COURT: It's an important issue. You should have
19 as much time as you think is needed to address it --

20 MR. GAFFEY: Thank you, Your Honor.

21 THE COURT: -- in a manner consistent with your
22 professional obligations to the movants, and I also need the
23 time to review the materials that you're going to be collecting
24 and that Barclays is submitting. But I have a question about
25 what happens Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday. Our witness

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1 tomorrow is who?

2 MR. SCHILLER: Tony Leitner, Your Honor. Mr. Leitner.

3 THE COURT: And that will be a full day?

4 MR. SCHILLER: We don't expect it to. Two-thirds of a
5 day.

6 THE COURT: So it'll take part of the day?

7 MR. SCHILLER: Yes.

8 THE COURT: A good part of the day. And then
9 Professor Pfleiderer is coming in on Wednesday?

10 MR. SCHILLER: Yes.

11 THE COURT: And that's the last Barclays identified
12 expert?

13 MR. SCHILLER: Yes.

14 THE COURT: And he'll either be concluded on Wednesday
15 or, if necessary, on Thursday?

16 MR. SCHILLER: That's what we expect, Your Honor, yes.

17 THE COURT: And that means --

18 MR. SCHILLER: He's teaching on Friday, so he expects
19 to go back Thursday night.

20 THE COURT: I'm sorry?

21 MR. SCHILLER: He's teaching on Friday, and expects to
22 return Thursday night.

23 THE COURT: Okay. It seems to me that one --

24 MR. SCHILLER: He would like to address --

25 THE COURT: It seems to me that one witness should

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1 be, even an important one, should be finished in two full days,
2 which means that Friday is open. So why don't we simply
3 reserve Friday morning at 10 a.m., since we don't have
4 witnesses --

5 MR. GAFFEY: Thank you, Your Honor.

6 THE COURT: -- for purposes of the
7 PricewaterhouseCoopers argument, part two.

8 MR. GAFFEY: If I might, Your Honor, under the heading
9 of no surprises we have a small dispute brewing about witness
10 order that you may -- Your Honor may recall the name Uma
11 Krishnan raised in connection with the famous GFS reports.

12 THE COURT: Yes.

13 MR. GAFFEY: I've asked Barclays to make her available
14 as a very short, but as a rebuttal witness, depending on the
15 testimony we hear from Mr. Pfleiderer, and I'm told if I don't
16 take her tomorrow they won't produce her. I can subpoena her,
17 but I was hoping to resolve it. I'm going to talk to them to
18 see if we can resolve this, but we've taken Your Honor's point
19 before about not surprising you with last minute disputes, and
20 this one's about half an hour old. So I hope you have a
21 resolution.

22 THE COURT: Well, I consider that reasonable notice.
23 That's fine.

24 MR. SCHILLER: Your Honor, not to interrupt Mr. Hume's
25 (sic) argument, but I want to clarify one thing for Your Honor

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1 and get Your Honor's direction in this with respect to
2 Pricewaterhouse. The three valuation people, we submitted
3 their testimony. They were on videotape by movants. We
4 submitted their deposition designations long ago. They have
5 them. They're in your record. They're going to be going
6 before Your Honor. They were relied on by Gary Romain.
7 They'll be relied on by our expert.

8 They didn't examine him at trial. We felt that was
9 sufficient. You have that evidence. We didn't not give you
10 that evidence. We gave it to you from all three individuals.

11 THE COURT: I understand.

12 MR. SCHILLER: And if Your Honor wants us to, if Your
13 Honor wants to see them we'll call them.

14 THE COURT: No, it's fine. I mean, the --

15 MR. SCHILLER: Live.

16 THE COURT: The point I was making, it's a fairly
17 obvious point. I was speaking at a program at Georgetown Law
18 School on Friday, and one of the things that I was talking
19 about was judicial perception in a completely different
20 setting. It was about how bankruptcy courts recognize whether
21 or not a particular dispute is core, noncore, whether it's
22 arising in or arising under, when is a matter properly to be
23 remanded to the state court or kept as an adversary proceeding
24 in the bankruptcy court. I'm certainly not going to repeat
25 what I said there, except for this one reference point, which

1 is that like everyone judges are just people, and we know what
2 we know because of perceptions that we make, hopefully correct
3 ones. But not always. And the perception of something is
4 sometimes at least as important, if not more important, than
5 the reality.

6 For that reason, for jurisdictional purposes sometimes
7 it's very difficult to make a judgment early in a bankruptcy
8 case when you don't know all the facts, you don't have a good
9 feel for what's going on. This is a different situation. This
10 is a very significant, very high level, very skillfully tried
11 dispute, which has been going on for, apparently, twenty-nine
12 days of trial, if I take Mr. Gaffey's count as an accurate
13 count. It feels longer. But however long it has actually
14 been, it's a process in which we have, collectively, been
15 engaged in an extremely important process of uncovering the
16 truth in respect of extraordinarily complex matters that are in
17 dispute. And in the process of uncovering the truth various
18 impressions come across the bench. And we had this dialogue in
19 a different context when we were talking about the videotaped
20 depositions of certain witnesses. And I said, and I meant it,
21 that I weight testimony based upon the interpersonal nature of
22 the storytelling. You are all involved in a process of telling
23 me a story, both through your live witnesses, what you tell me
24 from the podium or from counsel table and the documents that
25 you offer into evidence or use in the examination of witnesses.

1 And that narrative is embellished in this trial more so than in
2 many, because of the amount in controversy, with the screens
3 and the highlighting and the blowing up of certain provisions
4 of documents so that I am well aware, as a result of having sat
5 here for as long as I have and paying attention to the
6 narrative as it has been told to me, as to what the parties
7 consider important and what the key issues are in the case.
8 Even before we get to closing arguments I think I have a pretty
9 good idea as to the strengths and weaknesses on both sides.

10 But it's also true that even though the record
11 includes designated deposition testimony, and that is material
12 that I am certainly free to consider in reaching ultimate
13 conclusions here, it's very different when someone who is
14 saying the same thing is telling it to me in person. For one
15 thing, it demonstrates that this is a matter of significance to
16 the parties, important enough to fly witnesses in from London,
17 important enough to create the best possible impression for the
18 Court, important enough to be worthy of live trial time, a very
19 expensive, and, ultimately, inefficient process, but one that
20 is extraordinarily important as we look to find the truth. So
21 if Mr. Diamond is here and Mr. Varley is here, that's telling
22 me something. That's telling me Barclays cares about this at
23 the highest level.

24 MR. SCHILLER: Yes, sir.

25 THE COURT: You could have --

1 MR. SCHILLER: Patrick Clackson was here.

2 THE COURT: You could have designated testimony, but
3 you brought in the senior officers of Barclays to tell me their
4 story and to expose themselves to cross-examination.

5 MR. SCHILLER: Right. Just to remind the Court, we
6 brought in the CFO, Patrick Clackson, responsible for the
7 accountant, and the Chief Technical Accountant, Gary Romain, to
8 do just that --

9 THE COURT: I understand. I'm not --

10 MR. SCHILLER: -- on quantification and valuation --

11 THE COURT: I'm not debating your trial strategy here
12 at all.

13 MR. SCHILLER: -- from London.

14 THE COURT: All I'm saying is it is a matter of
15 interest to me, that I am a little bit like the classic Greek
16 philosopher, I think it was Plato, who sits in a cave and looks
17 at the shadows on the cave wall from the fire in the cave.
18 Much of what I see is indirect. And for that reason you need
19 to recognize that the fact that nobody from the Product Control
20 Group showed up live, I view as interesting. Whether it's
21 important, whether it changes anything, I have not any idea at
22 this point.

23 But that, coupled with the fact that nobody from
24 Pricewaterhouse has testified, I also view as interesting.
25 Because the key information concerning the ultimate valuation

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1 judgments made within Barclays after the acquisition remains
2 somewhat guarded. Just because something is in an acquisition
3 balance sheet or in native format on some kind of computer
4 screen that I get to see every once in a while, that doesn't
5 tell me exactly how individuals charged with the responsibility
6 of valuing positions did that. In fact, Gary Romain didn't
7 know that. So, and, obviously, we had Stephen King. We had
8 all kinds of witnesses, and I remember them, and I'm not, for a
9 moment, suggesting that anybody else should show up. I'm
10 simply saying that as it relates to the Pricewaterhouse
11 documents we're dealing with something that is very important,
12 and we're going to deal with it after it's briefed. The case
13 is in. Is there anything more for this afternoon?

14 MR. GAFFEY: No housekeeping from us, Your Honor,
15 unless you want to hear about the case baby who was born over
16 the weekend, so --

17 THE COURT: Who's --

18 MR. GAFFEY: One of our associates had the first baby
19 of the Rule 60 motions.

20 THE COURT: Oh, that's terrific.

21 MR. GAFFEY: Yes.

22 THE COURT: Was it a boy or a girl?

23 MR. GAFFEY: It's a girl, and her name is Amelia Kenny
24 (ph.), and I promised her mother I'd get her on the record.
25 Thank you, Your Honor.

1 THE COURT: Okay. Yes, that's on the record.

2 MR. SCHILLER: Your Honor, there is one other issue.

3 THE COURT: Order that page.

4 MR. SCHILLER: We were told by Mr. Gaffey today that
5 he wants to call another witness. We said no to him over
6 lunch. This is the woman responsible, who knows about GFS
7 data. This is Ms. Krishnan, who was introduced to Your Honor
8 by name several weeks ago, and you said if you want to call her
9 talk to Barb (ph.), please. Decide when to call her. And I
10 asked him last week you're done. Are you done? He said I am
11 done. Then I told Your Honor then we would be calling
12 Professor Pfleiderer. No more facts. Here's our wrap-up
13 expert. Now, this morning he says well, we may want to call
14 her about GFS. That's a new issue. It just happened at lunch
15 break. The case may not be closed in that respect. We've
16 objected to his request. I don't know whether he wants to
17 argue it or not. She is available. We spoke with her at lunch
18 when we got his e-mail or whatever it was. She's available
19 tomorrow. She's not available after that. Professor
20 Pfleiderer is testifying Wednesday and Thursday. We don't want
21 to have fact witnesses after the expert case. That's not
22 traditional. It's not been ordered by Your Honor. It's not
23 been agreed by the parties, and that is what we're now faced
24 with today at lunch.

25 MR. GAFFEY: She's a rebuttal witness, Your Honor.

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1 Professor Pfleiderer is going to testify, I expect, with regard
2 to the GFS data. Your Honor knows the GFS issue. I won't
3 rehash it.

4 THE COURT: Right.

5 MR. GAFFEY: We're going to cross-examine Professor
6 Pfleiderer, and we're going to ask him about GFS, and depending
7 on what he says or doesn't say we may need brief rebuttal from
8 Ms. Krishnan, who is a Barclays' employee. So it's rebuttal.
9 It's not reopening our fact case. We'll make the decision
10 after Professor Pfleiderer as to whether we need to call her.
11 If we call her it's going to be an hour, but I certainly didn't
12 want to wait until the case was over, the expert case was over,
13 and say okay, now, let's talk about rebuttal witnesses.

14 What I don't want to do is call her tomorrow. I don't
15 want to surface the issue. I want to see what Professor
16 Pfleiderer has to say, and if I need to rebut what I think he
17 might say we'll need Uma Krishnan for that for about one hour.

18 THE COURT: Okay. Do you wish to comment on that, Mr.
19 Schiller?

20 MR. SCHILLER: Well, Your Honor, we've been with you
21 for a number of months now. There's been no discussion, no
22 consideration, no planning of a rebuttal case. We believed
23 there was no provision for a rebuttal case by the parties or at
24 Your Honor's initiative.

25 THE COURT: Well, here's what we'll do with this one

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1 hour witness. We have an expert case that we're in the midst
2 of right now. Mr. Gaffey has indicated no desire to take this
3 witness out of order or to ask questions of her prior to the
4 completion of Professor Pfleiderer's examination, and he has
5 identified her as a rebuttal witness. Whether or not there
6 will be rebuttal witnesses is a question that I can address at
7 the conclusion of the expert testimony. If there is a need for
8 a rebuttal witness, and if I conclude that there should be a
9 rebuttal portion of the case, we have a trial day reserved
10 already on the 18th of October, which we can use for that
11 purpose, if necessary, and in noting that that's an available
12 day I, by no means, wish to suggest that I think that we need
13 to have a rebuttal witness. I have an open mind on that
14 question. We can argue that, along with the PwC issues, on
15 Friday at 10.

16 MR. SCHILLER: Just to respond to the Court. We will
17 consider that, Your Honor, in terms of our own rebuttal case
18 for the motion we've opposed by the trustees. Take that into
19 consideration as well.

20 THE COURT: Okay.

21 MR. SCHILLER: Thank you, Judge.

22 THE COURT: Everybody's rights are reserved. We're
23 adjourned till tomorrow.

24 (Whereupon these proceedings were concluded at 3:07 PM)

25

1

2 I N D E X

3

4 T E S T I M O N Y

5	WITNESS	EXAM BY	PAGE	LINE
6	John Olvany (voir dire)	Mr. Tambe	5	19
7	John Olvany	Mr. Tambe	14	21
8	John Olvany	Mr. Thomas	40	12
9	John Olvany	Mr. Tambe	118	2

10

11

12 E X H I B I T S

13	PARTY	NO	DESCRIPTION	ID.	EVID.
14	Movants	152	Expert report prepared by		15
15			John Olvany		
16	Movants	152A	CV of John Olvany		6
17	Movants	823	Declaration of John Olvany		16
18	Movants	910	Demonstrative prepared by		124
19			Professor Zmijewski		
20	Movants	913	Demonstrative prepared by		124
21			Mr. Garvey		
22	Movants	917	Demonstrative prepared by		124
23			Mr. Schwaba		
24	Movants	920	Demonstrative prepared by		124
25			Mr. Slattery		

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1

2 E X H I B I T S (cont'd.)

3 PARTY	NO	DESCRIPTION	ID.	EVID.
4 Movants	930	Excerpt of offering circular		28
5		used in Mr. Olvany's valuation		
6		of the Giants Stadium LLC bonds		
7 Movants	958	Deck prepared by Mr. Olvany		123

8

9

10 R U L I N G S

11 DESCRIPTION	PAGE	LINE
12 John Olvany accepted as an expert in the	14	17
13 valuation of corporate securities		

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C E R T I F I C A T I O N

3

4 I, Clara Rubin, certify that the foregoing transcript is a true
5 and accurate record of the proceedings.

6

7

8 Clara Rubin

9 AAERT Certified Electronic Transcriber (CET**D-491)

10 Also transcribed by: Hana Copperman (CET**D-487)

11

12 Veritext

13 200 Old Country Road

14 Suite 580

15 Mineola, NY 11501

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17 Date: October 5, 2010

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